



The type of discharge which a man receives upon being separated
from the Armed Services can have a profound effect on his civilian
life. Not unexpectedly, therefore, much concern has been recently
expressed concerning the safeguards and procedures available to
the serviceman to contest an unfavorable discharge, both before
and after termination of his military service. This article ex-
haustively examines the problems surrounding the administrative
discharge and the limitations being imposed on its unfair use by
the military itself, by the courts, and by Congress.
INTRODUCTION
N 1962 the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Judiciary Committee opened legislative hearings on the consti-
tutional rights of military personnel by emphasizing concern that
|administrative discharges were being increasingly used by the Armed
Services to circumvent safeguards for the serviceman which Congress
had provided in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.1  Those
hearings resulted in a number of legislative recommendations
2
and the introduction by Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. of several bills
to provide service personnel with new protection in military ad-
ministrative actions and to reverse the trend towards their use.3
None of these bills was the subject of hearings during the Eighty-
Eighth Congress; but they were all reintroduced in the present
* A.B. 1947, LL.B. 1950, Harvard University. Adjunct Professor of Law, Duke
University. Consultant and former Counsel, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Author, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (1956).
1 See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962
Hearings]. The Uniform Code of Military Justice was enacted on May 5, 1950,
64 Stat. 108, and is now codified in 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
See SUBCOMMITTE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., IST Srss., SUMMARY-REPORT OF HEARINGS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 SuM-
MARY-REPORT].
On August 6, 1963, Senator Ervin and several co-sponsors introduced eighteen
bills, S. 2002 to S. 2019, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), pertaining to military justice and
administrative discharges. 109 CONG. REc. 14139 (1963).
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Congress.4 During January of 1966, Senate hearings took place under
Senator Ervin's chairmanship to determine what need currently
exists for enactment of these measures.0
Like Congress, the courts also have been concerned with pos-
sible abuses of the administrative discharge-especially when such a
discharge is predicated upon alleged misconduct which could be
made the subject of a trial by court-martial, in which the protec-
tions of the Uniform Code would be applicable. 6 Recent decisions
inveighing against such matters as command influence on admin-
istrative boards, 7 failures to provide opportunities for confrontation
and cross-examination,8 and deviations by military authorities from
their own regulations9 make it probable that administrative action
will be used less frequently by the Armed Services in the future in
separating undesirables. Indeed, a recent decision by the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reveals a willingness to extend the
scope of judicial relief even to punitive discharges pursuant to court-
martial sentence.10
Meanwhile-probably in substantial part because of congressional
and judicial scrutiny"-the Armed Services have been revising their
procedures for administrative discharges. Legally-trained military
counsel are now being made more readily available to the respondent
IS. 745 to S. 762, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See 111 CONG. REC. 1227-45 (daily
ed. Jan. 26, 1965).
"The hearings were scheduled as joint hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights and of a special three-member subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee-the latter subcommittee being composed of Senators
Ervin, Cannon, and Thurmond. Senator Ervin is the chairman of each subcommittee-
a circumstance which greatly facilitated the holding of the joint hearings. Originally,
six days of hearings were scheduled for January 1966, but only four days could be
completed. Three more days of hearings took place in March 1966.
0 These protections include rights to assistance of counsel, confrontation and cross-
examination, opportunity to obtain witnesses, and protection against double jeopardy.
See Dougherty & Lynch, The Administrative Discharge: Military Justice?, 83 GEo.
WASH. L. Rxv. 498, 499 n.7 (1964).
¢ See Cole v. United States, Civil No. 112-63, Ct. Cl., June 11, 1965.
'See Gamage v. Zuckert, Civil No. 1124-64, D.D.C., Sept. 30, 1965 (Holtzoff, J.).
9 See, e.g., Roberts v. Vance, 343 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Murray v. United States,
154 Ct. Cl. 185 (1961); Clackum v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 404, 296 F.2d 226 (1960).
10 Ashe v. McNamara, 335 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965).
"'At the January 1966 hearings on the Ervin bills, Mr. John J. Finn, who appeared
in behalf of the American Legion, expressed his opinion that the Department of De-
fense had promulgated a new directive concerning administrative discharges on De-
cember 20, 1965, see note 14 infra and accompanying text, because of the imminence
of the hearings. Mr. Herbert Marks, an attorney who appeared at the hearings, indi-
cated that pre-trial briefings of certain Air Force boards had been abandoned only after
questions as to their legality had been raised by the opinion of the Court of Claims
in Cole v. United States, Civil No. 112-63, Ct. Cl., June 11, 1965.
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serviceman in administrative proceedings; administrative "double
jeopardy" is being curtailed;12 and probation has been authorized
for administrative discharges.'3 Indeed, on the eve of the January
1966 Senate hearings, the Department of Defense issued a new
directive, providing extensive new protections for the serviceman.14
This three-pronged movement to change the rules governing ad-
ministrative discharges becomes all the more significant at a time
when rapid expansion of military manpower is taking place and
when many more Americans are becoming subject to military dis-
charge action. Furthermore, with active hostilities in progress, it
becomes imperative to achieve a proper reconciliation of the needs
of military discipline with the requirements of justice to the indi-
vidual serviceman. In addition, the permissible scope of use for the
administrative discharge may have some effect on military personnel
policies; there will be greater willingness to induct or enlist men
falling in certain "borderline" categories if they can be readily
eliminated in the event they prove unsatisfactory or undesirable.
A. The Kinds of Discharge
Five kinds of discharge are currently in use: 1) honorable;
2) general-which, while under honorable conditions, is different
from an honorable discharge; 3) undesirable; 4) bad conduct; and
5) dishonorable. The honorable discharge and the general discharge
are identical with respect to entitling their holders to benefits ad-
22 See 1963 SUMMARY-REPORT 6, which refers to a curtailment by the Air Force
of administrative "double jeopardy" soon after the 1962 Senate hearings. An amend-
ment dated Jan. 18, 1966, adding paragraph V. (A.) 8. to the most recent Department of
Defense directive, see note 14 infra and accompanying text, also provides safeguards
against the former practice of referring an administrative discharge case to a second
discharge board if the reviewing authority considered the board's findings and recom-
mendations to be unduly favorable to the respondent serviceman.
23 The report on the 1962 hearings commented: "The execution of a punitive
discharge imposed by a court-martial can be suspended. However, so far as the
subcommittee has been informed, there is no formal procedure for suspending an
administrative discharge or putting a serviceman on probation before the issuance of
the discharge. (Subsequent to the hearings the subcommittee was informally ad-
vised that the Navy has developed a practice resembling probation for a sailor who
has been recommended for an administrative discharge.)" 1963 SuMmARY-REPORT 13.
The Air Force also subsequently authorized a Probation and Rehabilitation Program
for Airmen Subject to Administrative Discharge for Cause. Air Force Reg. 39-3,
Aug. 18, 1964. Department of Defense Directive 1332.14, para. X., Dec. 20, 1965 au-
thorizes the suspension of execution of an approved administrative discharge.
"'Administrative Discharges, Department of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Dec. 20,




ministered either by a military department or by the Veterans Ad-
ministration.1 However, the general discharge seems often to be
viewed-by prospective civilian employers and others-as carrying an
implied stigma; the public reasons that, since the overwhelming
percentage of discharges are honorable, there must be some defect
in a man who has only received a general discharge.16
Honorable, general, and undesirable discharges can only result
from administrative action and cannot be included as part of a court-
martial sentence. Bad conduct and dishonorable discharges are
punitive and can only be imposed by a court-martial-bad conduct
discharges by either special or general court-martial, and dishonor-
able discharges only by general court-martial. 1 Officer's dismissal
--which can only be imposed by general court-martial. 8-corresponds
in effect and in stigma to the dishonorable discharge for enlisted
personnel. While an officer cannot be sentenced to a bad conduct
discharge, 9 he is subject to administrative separation as undesirable.
The bad conduct discharge, which is punitive, and the un-
desirable discharge, which is administrative, are quite similar in
their effects on benefits; 20 and one can only speculate as to which
' See 1962 Hearings 15-18, 354-64.
20 See 1963 SUMMfARY-REPORT 5; 1962 Hearings 328, 330-41. Air Force Reg. 39-10,
March 17, 1959, comments in paragraph 8a: "However, a general discharge has been
found to be a definite disadvantage to an airman seeking civilian employment." See
also Murray v. United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 185 (1961).
2 See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 18-19, 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 819 (1964).
A bad-conduct discharge cannot be imposed by a special court-martial unless a com-
plete record is made of the proceedings and testimony. Since the Army does not
authorize the use of court reporters for special courts-martial, a verbatim record can-
not be prepared, and, as a consequence, a special court-martial convened in the Army
cannot issue a bad conduct discharge.
Under 38 U.S.C. § 3103 (1964), a discharge by reason of a general court-martial
sentence-whether that discharge be dishonorable or for bad conduct-will bar all rights
to veterans benefits based on the period of service which has been terminated by
the punitive discharge. On the other hand, a bad conduct discharge imposed by a
special court-martial does not necessarily bar these veterans benefits.
IsAn officer dismissed by order of the President may make a demand for trial by
general court-martial; and, in the event of failure to convene such a court-martial
within six months, an administrative discharge must be substituted for the dismissal.
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 4 (b), 10 U.S.C. § 804 (b) (1964).
19 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL-UNITED STATES 126d (1951) [hereinafter cited
as MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL]. A warrant officer may be sentenced by a general
court-martial to a dishonorable discharge but not to a bad conduct discharge. Ibid.
Since a special court-martial does not have authority to adjudge a dismissal or a
dishonorable discharge and lacks some of the safeguards available in general courts-
martial, it is unusual to try an officer or warrant officer by special court-martial-even
though such a trial would apparently not violate any statutory restriction.
20 See 1962 Hearings 15-18, 354-64; Dougherty & Lynch, supra note 6, at 499-500.
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carries the greater stigma.21 However, the bad conduct discharge is
subject to extensive procedures for review prescribed by the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice-including an opportunity to petition
for review by the Court of Military Appeals22-while the undesirable
discharge is not subject to a clearly-defined statutory procedure for
review.
B. Misconduct As a Basis for Discharge Action
The situation regarding discharges is confused by the fact that
misconduct which could be punished by a punitive discharge-a
dishonorable or bad conduct discharge for an enlisted man or dis-
missal for an officer-may, instead of being imposed by court-martial.
be made the basis for an administrative discharge, perhaps discharge
under other than honorable conditions. And even an administra.
tive discharge, especially if undesirable, carries consequences for the
recipient which may be far more serious than those ordinarily con-
nected with a mere termination of employment.
The overlap can be illustrated in terms of the discussion of "un-
fitness" which appears in the most recent Department of Defense
Directive concerning "Administrative Discharges," which was issued
on December 20, 1965 to take effect ninety days later:
Unfitness. Discharge by reason of unfitness, with an Unde-
sirable Discharge, unless the particular circumstances in a given
case warrant a General or Honorable Discharge, when an indi-
vidual's military record in his current enlistment or period of obli-
gated service includes one or more of the following:
1. Frequent involvement of a discreditable nature with civil
or military authorities.
However, if the bad conduct discharge has been imposed by a general court-martial,
veterans benefits are automatically barred by statute. 38 U.S.C. § 3103 (1964).
-1 Chief Judge Quinn of the Court of Military Appeals testified concerning the
undesirable discharge: "I think . . . it is worse than a bad conduct discharge, as far
as its implications are concerned, and the results also are quite severe." 1962 Hear-
ings 188. As the late Congressman Doyle described the stigma of the undesirable
discharge: "He is an undesirable. You don't want to have anything to do with him.
You don't go into detail to find out what makes him undesirable. You think he
may be a thief, he may be a homosexual, he may not be supporting his children, his
family in the minds of some people, but he is undesirable, you don't want him around.
And I think the ordinary patriotic, sound thinking American citizen doesn't want to
have anything to do with an undesirable man and that applies to an undesirable man
from the military, something has occurred there in the military for which he has
gotten an undesirable discharge; it is a stigma. It is a liability and a heavy one." Id.
at 328. For other views see id. at 257-58.
22 Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 66-67, 10 U.S.C. §§ 866-67 (1964).
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2. Sexual perversion including but not limited to (1) lewd
and lascivious acts, (2) homosexual acts, (3) sodomy, (4)
indecent exposure, (5) indecent acts with or assault upon a
child, or (6) other indecent acts or offenses.
3. Drug addiction, habituation, or the unauthorized use or
possession of narcotics, hypnotics, sedatives, tranquilizers,
stimulants, hallucinogens, and other similar known harm-
- ful or habit forming drugs and/or chemicals.
4. An established pattern for shirking.
5. An established pattern showing dishonorable failure to pay
just debts.
6. An established pattern showing dishonorable failure to con-
tribute adequate support to dependents or failure to comply
with orders, decrees, or judgments of a civil court concern-
ing support of dependents.
7. Unsanitary habits.
23
In light of the fact that article 134 of the Uniform Code pro-
scribes "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces,"2 4 the directive's first category of unfitness-"frequent involve-
ment of a discreditable nature with civil or military authorities"-
would usually, if not inevitably, import the commission of a series
of violations of the Uniform Code. Moreover, under the Manual
for Courts-Martial, which is itself an executive order promulgated
by the President,25 the repeated violations, even though minor, could
result in a bad conduct (or dishonorable) discharge,20 if they were
-, 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. VII. (I.).
z' 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
25Exec. Order No. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303 (1951). See also Uniform Code of
Military Justice art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1964). The President, of course, may issue
further executive orders to modify the maximum punishments prescribed in the
Manual for Courts-Martial. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10247, 16 Fed. Reg. 5035 (1951),
suspending limitations upon punishments for violations of certain articles of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice; Exec. Order No. 10628, 20 Fed. Reg. 5741 (1955),
restoring these limitations upon punishments; Exec. Order No. 10652, 21 Fed. Reg.
235 (1956), amending the Manual for Courts-Martial as to automatic reduction in-
cluded in certain sentences; Exec. Order No. 10565, 19 Fed. Reg. 6299 (1954), amend-
ing the maximum permissible punishments for certain offenses.
- MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 127c contains as § A a Table of Maximum Pun-
ishments authorized for various offenses. Section B authorizes: "Permissible Additional
Punishments.-If an accused is found guilty of an offense or offenses for none of
which dishonorable or bad conduct discharge is authorized, proof of two or more
previous convictions will authorize bad conduct discharge and forfeiture of all pay
and allowances and, if the confinement otherwise authorized is less than three
months, confinement at hard labor for three months." Id. 127c, at 228. Exec. Order
10565, 19 Fed. keg. 6299 (1954), added the following provision to § B of 127c:
"If an accused is found guilty of an offense or offenses for none of which dishonorable
discharge is authorized, proof of three or more previous convictions during the
[Vol. 1966: 41
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proved before a court-martial. But, again, in a court-martial pro-
ceeding the accused would receive a number of protections unavail-
able to him as respondent in an administrative proceeding which
might result in his undesirable discharge for unfitness.
The second category of unfitness-"sexual perversion"-would
generally involve acts which constituted very serious violations of
the Uniform Code, authorizing both discharge and extensive con-
finement if tried by court-martial.2 7 As to the third category of un-
fitness, "drug addiction" would presumably be a sickness that could
not in itself be made the subject of court-martial; 28 and one might
also question whether such a sickness can constitutionally be made
the basis of an undesirable discharge-which is not medical and
hence carries considerable stigma.29  However, unauthorized use
or possession of narcotics and the like, as covered in this third cate-
gory, would generally be a violation of article 134 of the Uniform
Code and would authorize a punitive discharge if the possessor or
user were tried therefor by a court-martial.30
An "established pattern for shirking"-the subject of the fourth
category of unfitness-would often involve derelictions in duty and
failures to obey, which are violations of article 92 of the Uniform
Code and thus are subject to trial by court-martial.31 With respect
year next preceding the commission of any offense of which the accused stands con-
victed will authorize dishonorable discharge and forfeiture of all pay and allowances
and, if the confinement otherwise authorized is less than one year, confinement at
hard labor for one year." The existence of these habitual offender provisions makes
it difficult to contend that an administrative discharge is the only way to get rid of
the serviceman who commits a series of minor violations. If these violations are
reflected in convictions by summary or special court-martial, the serviceman can
ultimately be subjected to a punitive discharge and substantial confinement as well.
' An act of sodomy, which is punishable under 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1964), authorizes
a dishonorable discharge, total forfeiture of pay and allowances, and confinement at
hard labor for not more than five years. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 127c, at
223. An indecent act or assault-punishable under 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964) as
service-discrediting conduct-will authorize equally severe punishment. MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL 127c, at 224-26
28 Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
20 Under the new Department of Defense Directive a general discharge may be
issued by reason of unsuitability resulting from "alcoholism." 1965 Dep't of Defense
Directive para. VII. (G.)5. To the extent that a general discharge carries a stigma,
the argument might be made that the recipient is being "punished" for his sickness.
Compare the recent ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Driver
v. Hinnant, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 1121 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 1966).
3oSee MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 213a. The Table of Maximum Punishments
authorizes a dishonorable discharge and up to five years confinement for wrongful
possession or use of habit-forming drugs or marihuana. Id. 127c, at 225.
"Under the Table of Maximum Punishments the punishments authorized for
violations of Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1964), are
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to the fifth category-a pattern of "dishonorable failure to pay just
debts"-the Manual for Courts-Martial reveals that punishment in
the form of a dishonorable discharge and up to six months con-
finement could be imposed by a court-martial for even a single
failure to pay a just debt.32
The sixth category of unfitness is dishonorable failure to support
dependents, and it is not improbable that such conduct would be
"service-discrediting" within the meaning of article 134 of the
Uniform Code and, therefore, would be punishable by court-
martial.33 Conceivably "unsanitary habits," which constitute the
seventh category of unfitness, would be violations of article 134 in
themselves;3 4 they might constitute dereliction in the performance
of duties.35 In any event, continuance of these habits in the face of
a lawful order to the contrary could be made the basis of punishment
by court-martial.36
In short, those acts which in the eyes of the Armed Services demon-
strate a serviceman's unfitness, and thus can be made the basis of an
administrative proceeding to separate an "undesirable," could
generally be prosecuted before a court-martial. And in most in-
stances such acts would authorize the court-martial to impose not
only a sentence of confinement and the forfeiture of pay and al-
lowances, but also a punitive discharge. However, the procedures
involved-and the protections for the serviceman-will differ mark-
these: (a) dishonorable discharge and up to two years confinement for failure to obey
any lawful general order or regulation; (b) bad conduct discharge and up to six
months confinement for failure to obey any other lawful order; and (c) three months
confinement for being derelict in the performance of duties and forfeiture of % pay
per month not to exceed three months. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 127c, at 221.
Of course, where there has been an "established pattern," the possibility would exist
of utilizing the permissible additional punishments authorized under MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL 127c, § B. See note 26 supra.
2 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 127c, at 225. See United States v. Kirksey, 6
U.S.C.M.A. 556, 20 C.M.R. 272 (1955); United States v. Downard, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 538,
20 C.M.R. 254 (1955).
3 Failure to pay an indebtedness may be service-discrediting according to Uniform
Code of Military Justice art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964). The dishonorable failure to
pay support to dependents would certainly seem to so qualify.
"These habits might be considered to involve either (a) disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the Armed Forces or (b) conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces. For a discussion of these concepts, as
interpreted by the Court of Military Appeals, see Everett, Article 134, Uniform Code
of Military Justice-A Study in Vagueness, 37 N.C.L. Rav. 142 (1959).
"5 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1964); MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 171c.
11 See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 90-92, 10 U.S.C. §§ 890-92 (1964).
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edly depending on the choice made by military authorities between
court-martial action and administrative discharge.
This choice may, in turn, be influenced by a desire to bypass the
very protections which are available to the accused before courts-
martial. Thus, the Court of Military Appeals commented in its
annual report for 1960:
The unusual increase in the use of the administrative dis-
charge since the code became a fixture has led to the suspicion
that the services were resorting to that means of circumventing
the requirements of the code. The validity of that suspicion was
confirmed by Maj. Gen. Reginald C. Harmon, then Judge Advo-
cate General of the Air Force, at the annual meeting of the Judge
Advocates Association held at Los Angeles, Calif., August 26,
1958. He there declared that the tremendous increase in unde-
sirable discharges by administrative proceedings was the result
of efforts of military commanders to avoid the requirements of
the Uniform Code. Although he acknowledged that men thereby
affected were deprived of the protections afforded by the code, no
action to curtail the practice was initiated.37
In a similar vein, the Armed Services have contended that they
should be free to eliminate a serviceman as unfit with an undesirable
discharge for alleged misconduct that clearly could not be established
beyond reasonable doubt before a court-martial, since the latter
is subject to the rules of evidence, corpus delicti requirements, and
the like.3 8 They have thus opposed Senator Ervin's proposed legis-
lation to grant to a serviceman who is the respondent in administra-
tive discharge proceedings for misconduct the election to require
trial by court-martial.3 9
C. Ramifications of Administrative versus Court-Martial Action
In the law many serious consequences hinge on the distinction
between "punitive" and "administrative" action.40 For some pur-
37 Quoted in 1962 Hearings 2.
38 See 1963 SuArmARY-REPoRT 9; 1962 Hearings 139. Brigadier General Kenneth J.
Hodson, Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Army, testified to this general effect
during the January 1966 Senate hearings. McCurdy v. Zuckert, Civil No. 65-132, M.D.
Fla., Nov. 4, 1965, now on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seems
to present this very problem.
ag S. 758, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). This bill was opposed by Defense spokesmen
at the January 1966 hearings. Compare Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 4, 10
U.S.C. § 804 (1964).
10 There are many instances when a conviction can give rise to serious collateral
consequences for the defendant, and no objection of former jeopardy will be available
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poses it might be very unfortunate to establish the principle that
every discharge under other than honorable conditions is "punitive."
For example, if such a principle were established, a serious ques-
tion would exist of the right to separate administratively as un-
desirable a serviceman who had been convicted of a serious crime
by a federal district court.41 On the other hand, the undesirable
discharge differs from other administrative action in that a major
purpose of the Armed Services in using such a discharge seems to be
the creation of a stigma for its recipient; absent such stigma there
would be little point in utilizing this label in discharge action. In
terms of its effects on reputation, the stigma experienced by the
recipient of a discharge under other than honorable conditions is
very akin to the concept of infamy-a concept which has some legal
significance.
42
Many jurisdictions differentiate felony from misdemeanor in
terms of whether the permissible punishment for the offense includes
penitentiary confinement; 43 presumably this differentiation reflects
a belief that being confined in a penitentiary is especially de-
grading, irrespective of the length of such confinement. Confine-
ment at hard labor often is differentiated in consequences from
mere confinement 44-again presumably by virtue of an assumption
to him. For example, in Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), deportation was
based on conviction of certain offenses involving moral turpitude. An attorney may be
disbarred for conviction of a crime demonstrating unfitness to practice law. 7 Ase.
JUR. 21, Attorneys at Law § 50 (1963). In most jurisdictions there are procedures
for revoking or suspending a driver's license by reason of convictions under the motor
vehicle laws. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16 (Supp. 1965). Moreover, civil sanctions
and forfeitures can be imposed for certain violations of law without regard to the
outcome of criminal proceedings which arise from the same facts. Rex Trailer Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537
(1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Various Items v. United States,
282 U.S. 577 (1931); cf. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957) (distinguishing
between criminal and civil contempt).
"In light of Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907), the defense of double
jeopardy would then be available to a serviceman who was being punished for the
second time.
"Under the fifth amendment a grand jury presentment or indictment is required
for prosecution of an "infamous crime." United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433
(1922), held that an offense is "infamous" if conviction thereof authorizes imposition
of an infamous punishment, and that imprisonment in a workhouse at hard labor
constitutes an "infamous" punishment. At common law, "infamous" crimes were
those which disqualified convicts as witnesses; and it was the nature of the offense,
not the punishment, that rendered it infamous. See CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF
Csass 100-01 (Wingersky rev. 1958).
"Id. at 97-99.
" See United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 441 (1922). However, under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 58 (b), 10 U.S.C. § 858 (b) (1964), a court-martial
cannot sentence an offender to confinement without hard labor.
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that the hard labor carries with it a special stigma and opprobrium.
Against this backdrop, it seems somewhat incongruous to allow the
Armed Services to stigmatize a serviceman for alleged misconduct
without providing him with a number of procedural safeguards.
The incongruity is heightened by the circumstance that although
the Congress-entrusted under the Constitution with the power to
"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces"45-has provided for the imposition of bad conduct
discharges and dishonorable discharges, no similar provision-indeed,
no express provision whatsoever-has been made for the use of un-
desirable discharges or for the safeguards which shall accompany
their use.46
" U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
"In Grant v. United States, 162 Ct. CI. 600 (1963), a former Navy enlisted man,
who had been discharged with a general discharge, contested its validity on the ground
that, since the discharge was by reason of oral sodomy with a female prostitute, he
should have been proceeded against criminally, rather than administratively. The
Court of Claims reasoned, however, that prosecution for sodomy under Uniform Code
of Military Justice art. 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1964), was not the sole means for
proceeding against a serviceman, that denial of a court-martial for him was not un-
constitutional, and that naval authorities could discharge him administratively.
Grant v. United States, supra at 608. The court commented: "He was not charged
criminally and consequently the safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
the Constitution do not come into the picture." Ibid. "Only a court-martial can
impose a punitive discharge and these discharges, i.e., bad conduct and dishonorable,
are imposed for punishment. The type of discharge plaintiff received was an ad-
ministrative discharge with no incumbent penalties." Id. at 609. In Rowe v. United
States, 167 Ct. Cl. 468 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965), the plaintiff was seek-
ing back pay by reason of his undesirable discharge. Rowe contended that the en-
actment of the Uniform Code, which authorizes courts-martial to adjudge dis-
honorable and bad conduct discharges, had preempted the field and had by impli-
cation prohibited the military services from administratively issuing any sort of
derogatory discharge that might diminish the benefits otherwise available to dis-
charged persons. Answering this contention, the court pointed out that § 6 of the
Act of May 5, 1950, 64 Stat. 145-the same act which in § 1 enacted the Uniform Code
of Military Justice-had provided that former Article of War 108, as amended, 41
Stat. 809 (1920), should continue to have the same force, effect, and applicability as
before, although it would no longer be known as an "Article of War." This article,
which thereby was retained in effect, provided that no enlisted person should be dis-
charged before the expiration of his term of service except by the President, or by
order of the secretary of the military department, or pursuant to a court-martial
sentence. The court pointed out that under this article, which emanates from Article
of War 11 in the Act of April 10, 1806, 2 Stat. 361, it had been held that the executive
branch of the Government possessed the authority to determine the form and terms of
discharge certificates to be issued administratively. See, e.g., Davis v. Woodring, 111
F.2d 523, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1940). The court then commented that it was ". . . sufficient
if the form and terms of a discharge certificate adequately indicated the nature of the
service performed .... Furthermore, this executive authority had been held to extend
to the issuance administratively of discharges without honor .... Congress showed a
dear intention, in section 6 of the same statute which enacted the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, that the executive authority respecting military discharges should con-
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Various methods have been proposed for reducing the divergence
between punitive and administrative discharge action. Perhaps
the simplest method would be to preclude the issuance of an ad-
ministrative discharge carrying any stigma for its recipient 47 and
to require that the only separations from service predicated on mis-
conduct be by punitive discharge resulting from sentence by court-
martial. However, this drastic reversal of the trend towards greater
use of administrative discharge, the trend which the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals criticized in 1960,48 might create substantial problems.
For one thing, would such a limitation on administrative discharges
make it impossible for the Armed Services to eliminate unfit and
unsuitable personnel readily enough to maintain military efficiency?
Also, commanders might decide that, in light of the limitations on
administrative discharges for misconduct and the difficulties and
annoyances of trying personnel by court-martial for violations of
the Uniform Code, it would be easiest to discharge unfit servicemen
with honorable discharges for the convenience of the Government.
In that event, the honorable discharge would be debased, and a
sort of misrepresentation would take place concerning the quality
of the service rendered by its recipient.
Another method proposed to limit the possibilities for abuse ifn
the issuance of administrative discharges would involve eliminating
from the discharge any characterization of the service rendered by
the recipient. Under such a proposal, there would be no honorable,
general, or undesirable discharge-only an administrative discharge.
This discharge document would not indicate expressly what sort
of service had been rendered, although it might refer to the regula-
tion or directive under which the discharge had been issued.
In some instances, that reference in the discharge in itself might
provide ample basis for inferring why the discharge had been issued-
for example, if the directive were one entitled "Discharges for
Sexual Perversion," "Discharges for Security," or the like. However,
the chief difficulty is that, by reason of the fact that millions of
American veterans have received honorable discharges in the past,
tinue and should not be affected by the enactment of the Code." Rowe v. United
States, supra at 472.
'1 Under this approach a question might arise as to whether the stigma created
by a general discharge would be sufficient to preclude its issuance-even though the
general discharge is under honorable conditions and does not affect adversely the
benefits administered either by the Armed Services or the Veterans Administration.
A8 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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a serviceman on duty today expects to be rewarded with an honor-
able discharge if he renders meritorious service; interfering with
that expectation seems an unsatisfactory solution,4 9 and would re-
quire considerable reeducation of the general public.
If, however, the administrative discharge for misconduct is to
continue its coexistence with the punitive discharge, what are, and
what should be, the safeguards for its use? First, this article will ex-
amine new safeguards which have been forthcoming-perhaps some-
what involuntarily-from the Armed Services themselves; then those
which have been expressed in judicial decisions; and finally those
proposed in the Ervin bills which are now pending before the
Senate.
I
SAFEGUARDS PROVIDED BY THE ARMED SERVICES
A. Safeguards Prior to Discharge
At one time only primitive safeguards existed for the serviceman
before he was issued an undesirable discharge.50 Gradually, how-
ever, the Armed Services have expanded the respondent's oppor-
tunity for a hearing of his contentions and have made legal counsel
more readily available to aid him. In cases where a board of officers
had recommended against issuance of an undesirable discharge or
even favored retention of the respondent, efforts by commanding
officers to circumvent or ignore the board's recommendation have
diminished. This trend towards expansion of the protections
furnished the serviceman by the Armed Services has culminated in
the Department of Defense Directive of December 20, 1965.51
Under the provisions of this directive, administrative discharges
for unsuitability-which may be either honorable or general dis-
charges-will not normally be issued for a) inaptitude; b) apathy,
defective attitudes, and inability to expend effort constructively;
c) alcoholism; or d) financial irresponsibility, until the prospective
recipient "has been counseled concerning his deficiencies and af-
forded a reasonable opportunity to overcome them."52 However,
the requirement of counseling would not apply to discharges for un-
," Some veterans benefits under state laws have hinged on the receipt of an honor-
able, rather than a general, discharge. See, e.g., Ohio Laws 1955-1956, at 830-31 (1955).
"o See, e.g., Clackum v. United States, 148 Ct. C. 404, 296 F.2d 226 (1960), where
the procedures used by Air Force authorities are reviewed and severely criticized.
". 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive paras. VII. (G.)I., 3., 5., 7.
2 rd. para. V. (A.)I.
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suitability by reason of character and behavior disorders, enuresis,
homosexual or other aberrant tendencies.
3
Similarly, the requirement for counseling and reasonable oppor-
tunity to overcome deficiencies would govern discharges for un-
fitness54-usually undesirable discharges-if based on a) frequent in-
volvement of a discreditable nature with civil or military authorities;
b) an established pattern for shirking; c) an established pattern
showing dishonorable failure to pay just debts; or d) an established
pattern showing dishonorable failure to contribute adequate support
to dependents.55 However, discharges for unfitness by reason of
sexual perversion, drug addiction, or unsanitary habits would not
fall under this requirement.5 6
By insisting on counseling to try to correct deficiencies, the
Armed Services have indicated their awareness of the suggestions
voiced during the 1962 Senate hearings that many administrative
discharges could be avoided by corrective action at the outset.
7
Absent this corrective action and the opportunity to reform, the
serviceman may return to civilian society with a type of discharge
that creates a stigma for him, limits his potential as a civilian, and
makes him a continuing problem for civil authorities; and the
services must write off their investment of time and money in train-
ing him. The provision for counseling prior to administrative dis-
charge action is paralleled by the authorization to suspend the execu-
tion of an approved discharge, so that a serviceman can be retained
on duty under probation after he has been initially recommended
for issuance of an administrative discharge.
58
The directive provides that no "member" of the Armed Forces
-i.e., no enlisted man or woman 59-is to be discharged under condi-
tions other than honorable unless he is afforded the right to present
" Id. paras. V. (A.)I., VII. (G.). Presumably it was believed that counselling would
be of little benefit in remedying these deficiencies.
SId. para. V. (A.)I.
' Id. paras. V. (A.)I., VII. (I.)1., 4., 5., 6.
Id. paras. VII. (1.)2., 3., 7.
57 See 1963 SUmmARY-REPORT 5.
rs 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. X. The Armed Services have devised
effective probation and rehabilitation procedures in connection with punitive dis-
charges. The Air Force's 3320th Retraining Group at Amarillo Air Force Base,
Texas, has been especially noteworthy in this regard. See 1962 Hearings 167-68, 943-44.
59 See definition of "member" in Dep't of Defense Directive para. IV. (A.). The
policies, standards and procedures prescribed by this directive apply only to the ad-
ministrative discharge of enlisted persons, id. para. I., and thus do not affect directly
the separation of officers and warrant officers.
[Vol. 1966: 41
MILITARY DISCHARGES
his case before an administrative discharge board with the advice
and assistance of counsel, 60 and unless such discharge is supported
by appropriate findings of that board and by the board's recom-
mendation for undesirable discharge. 61 Significantly, the respon-
dent's counsel must be a lawyer, as defined by article 27 (b) (1)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice2 "unless appropriate au-
thority certifies in the permanent record the nonavailability of a
lawyer so qualified and sets forth the qualifications of the substi-
tuted nonlawyer counsel."63 At the time of the 1962 Senate hear-
ings there existed no clear practice in the Armed Services of furnish-
ings lawyers to all respondents who were confronted with the
prospect of an undesirable discharge.64 To some extent the right to
legally-trained counsel depended on the "reasonable availability"
of a lawyer as determined by a commanding officer on the basis of a
number of factors. 65 Clearly the new directive is intended to re-
quire as a general rule that the respondent serviceman receive the
assistance of an attorney.
Interestingly, the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows special
courts-martial to impose a bad conduct discharge without regard
to whether the accused has been furnished with legally-trained coun-
sel.0 6 The Court of Military Appeals, overruling the Navy Board
of Review, held in 1963 that the Constitution did not require that a
serviceman before a court-martial be furnished with a lawyer if he
were to be sentenced only to a bad conduct discharge.67 The effect
of this decision, coupled with the new directive, is to produce a swing
of the pendulum, so that the serviceman now has a broader right to
counsel before an administrative discharge board than before a
special court-martial, although the undesirable discharge that the
board might impose would have effects roughly the same as those
6Id. para. V. (A.)2.
01 Ibid.
0 10 U.S.C. § 827 (b) (1) (1964). Under this provision the counsel must be a grad-
uate of an accredited law school or a member of the bar of a federal court or the
highest court of a state. For the most part, the Armed Services seek to maintain a
strict dichotomy between punitive action and administrative action, i.e., between the
requirements of the Uniform Code and those governing administrative discharges.
Yet in this instance a directive pertaining to administrative action incorporates a
definition contained in the Uniform Code.
011965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. IV. (K.).
"See 1962 Hearings 832-33, 860-61, 899, 903, 918, 930, 952-53.
"See 1963 SUMMARY-REPORT 43-44.
"10 U.S.C. §§ 819, 827 (1964).
'7 United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
Vol. 1966: 41)
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
of the bad conduct discharge to which the court-martial might
sentence an accused-and, in addition, the court-martial could im-
pose confinement and forfeitures.
The anomaly may be only temporary. A district court has re-
cently invalidated a sentence of confinement imposed by a special
court-martial before which the accused was represented by counsel
who lacked legal training. 8 Moreover, one of Senator Ervin's
legislative proposalsPO-in which the Department of Defense has ap-
parently acquiesced70-would deprive a special court-martial of the
authority to impose a discharge under other than honorable condi-
tions if the accused has not been represented by a qualified attorney.
The Department of Defense Directive of December 20, 1965,
prohibits the issuance of any discharge less favorable than the one
recommended by the administrative discharge board which has
heard the case.71 However, a board recommendation in favor of
retention is not binding; and notwithstanding such a recommenda-
tion, "the Discharge Authority may direct separation when warranted
by the circumstances of a particular case"-in which event the person
separated will receive "an Honorable or General Discharge certifi-
cate in accordance with the prescribed standards of the Service
concerned." 72 Thus, even though a board considers that the respon-
dent is suitable enough for retention in the service, a commanding
officer may later separate him with a general discharge-a discharge
that apparently creates some stigma for the recipient. 8
The power to override the administrative discharge board's
recommendation that a serviceman be retained in service negates
one possible limitation on the power of military authorities to
separate a serviceman whom they do not want on duty. The power
08 Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965). But cf. LeBallister v.
Warden, 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965). See also Neal v. United States, 34 U.S.
L. WEEK 2394 (Ct. Cl. Jan. 20, 1966).
59 S. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
7' This conclusion is based upon the statement of Brigadier General Kenneth J.
Hodson, who appeared at the January 1966 hearings as a principal Department of
Defense witness concerning those of the Ervin bills which pertained to military
justice.
"' 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. V. (A.)3. Prior to this directive the Air
Force and Army prohibited-while the Coast Guard, Marine Corps and Navy per-
mitted-the issuance of a discharge less favorable than that recommended by an ad-
ministrative board. See Dougherty & Lynch, The Administrative Discharge: Military
Justice?, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REy. 498, 515 (1964).
72 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. V. (A.)4.
"' See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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to discharge for the "convenience of the government," 74 with an
honorable or general discharge, also seems intended to provide
commanders with a broad authority to separate unwanted per-
sonnel. Such "convenience" includes these reasons: a) general
demobilization or reduction in authorized strength; b) "national
health, safety or interest"; c) "such other reasons as may be specified
and published by the Secretary of the Department concerned"; or d)
"notwithstanding the specific provisions of this Directive, the Secre-
tary of a Military Department may direct the separation of any
member for the Convenience of the Government prior to the ex-
piration of his term of service, if the Secretary determines that such
a separation is in the best interest of that Department."75
An inductee would have little basis or occasion to challenge
his separation for the convenience of the Government. On the
other hand, an enlistee in the regular establishment-who has
entered an enlistment contract to serve for a fixed period of time7q-
may feel injured by the termination of his personal service contract
for the mere convenience of the other party-i.e., the Government.
The services, in turn, would argue that the enlistment contract
was always subject to the condition subsequent of termination pur-
suant to regulations and directives promulgated by appropriate
military authorities. And the enlistee might reply that this con-
struction had the effect of making the contract "illusory"-a con-
tention which, however, generally has not been made successfully
in the field of government contracts.
77
7' 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. VII. (B.).
7 Id. paras. VII. (B.)I., B., 10., 11. Some other reasons of "convenience," having an
apparently less general applicability, are also stated in paragraph VII. (B.) of the
directive.
10 The enlistment contract has certain unique aspects which differentiate it from
other government contracts. See In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1890). In Bell v.
United States, 366 U.S. 393 (1961), the Government was sued for back pay by certain
persons who had been captured by the North Koreans during the Korean War and
later declined repatriation. The Government defended on the ground that the
plaintiffs had violated their obligation of faithful service to the United States and that,
under basic principles of contract law, they were barred from recovery under their
enlistment contracts because of their willful breach of that contract. Id. at 401. The
Supreme Court, however, after discussing the unique nature of an enlistment contract,
id. at 401-02, concluded that this contract produces a change of status, by reason of
which the enlistee is entitled to receive pay so long as he remains a member of the
Armed Forces, whether he performs service or not-unless his right to pay is for-
feited or lost in a manner prescribed by regulations or othenvise. Id. at 402.
7 Government contracts frequently contain clauses authorizing termination of
the contract for the convenience of the Government. If required by procurement
regulations, such a clause may be binding on the contractor even if omitted from the
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The Armed Services have long followed the practice of discharg-
ing administratively-usually with an undesirable discharge-a ser-
viceman who has been convicted of a felony or other serious offense
by a federal or state civil court.78 Continuation of this practice is
authorized in the new directive under the heading of "miscon-
duct."79 However, as was illustrated in one case which ultimately
reached the Supreme Court, 0 and as was discussed extensively in the
1962 Senate hearings, the possibility exists that a serviceman who
has received an undesirable discharge by reason of a civil court con-
viction may later appeal that conviction successfully and ultimately
be acquitted of the crime. To deal with this contingency, the new
directive authorizes processing for discharge notwithstanding the
filing of an appeal, but states a general policy of withholding exe-
cution of the approved discharge pending outcome of the appeal.,'
Thus, for the most part the serviceman will be able to continue on
duty despite his conviction until all his appellate remedies have been
exhausted in the civil courts; but it will not be necessary to keep
him on duty in the unusual case-for example, when the appeal
appears to be frivolous or taken solely for the purposes of delay.
However, even in these unusual cases, or in cases where no appeal
is taken but later the conviction is set aside by means of collateral at-
tack, the discharged serviceman would seem entitled to a change in
the character of his discharge after the charges have been disposed of
in his favor.8 2
contract. See G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 160 Ct. Cl. 1, 320 F.2d
345, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963).
78 Conviction in a foreign court for a serious crime may also result in ad-
ministrative discharge. Because of former jeopardy guarantees a serviceman cannot
be tried by court-martial for the same misconduct for which he has already been
tried in a federal district court, and vice versa. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S.
333 (1907). Similar guarantees are contained in the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment, June 19, 1951, art. VII, para. 8, [1953] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1792, T.I.A.S. No.
2846. There is no constitutional limitation on trial by court-martial for a crime
for which the serviceman has already been tried in a state court. However, such trials
seem to be rare. See 1962 Hearings 848, 909, 945.
7' 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. VII. (J.).
"Jackson v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 183, 297 F.2d 939 (1962), cert. dismissed,
372 U.S. 950 (1963). See 1963 SuMMARY-REPoRtT 10; 1962 Hearings,32-35, 158-59, 399,
963.
"' 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. V. (A.)6.
S2For instance, the writer represented a former serviceman who had received
an undesirable discharge because of a state court conviction for rape and incest.
Although no appeal was taken from the conviction, it was later set aside after being
collaterally attacked; and the charges were dismissed. Thereupon he sought relief
from the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records. The Correction Board's
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As a general rule, a serviceman cannot be court-martialled for
misconduct prior to service, or during a prior enlistment or period
of service; 3 nor can the character of a discharge be based on such
misconduct.84 This principle is reaffirmed in the new directive by
the requirement that prior service and pre-service activities not be
considered in determining the type of discharge certificate.8 5 How-
ever, this requirement does not apply to the decision of whether to
retain the serviceman or to separate him; in making that decision
the military authorities may consider activities antedating the cur-
rent period of service.s Thus, in so far as the affixing of any stigma
is concerned, the serviceman is protected, but he cannot insist on
retaining his military status in spite of discreditable incidents which
preceded his current period of service.
According to the directive, "Issuance of a General Discharge is
appropriate when a member's military record is not sufficiently
meritorious to warrant an Honorable Discharge as prescribed by
the regulations of the service concerned."87 This wording seems to
reflect the suggestion of some military officials that a general discharge
does not create a stigma but simply- involves the failure to confer a
special honor because of unusually meritorious service. Under this
view the general discharge is equivalent to graduation; and the hon-
orable discharge, to graduation cum laude.88 A major difficulty with
this approach is that the discharge statistics of the Armed Services
reveal that an overwhelming percentage of the persons discharged
under honorable conditions do receive an honorable, rather than a
general, discharge; 9 a substantially smaller percentage of college
graduates receive their degrees cum laude. Thus, the directive di-
recommendation to deny relief was not accepted in full by the Undersecretary of
the Army, who directed a change in the character of the applicant's discharge.
In Branaman v. United States, Civil No. 1407-60, D.D.C., Nov. 8, 1961, discussed in
1962 Hearings 962, the plaintiff had been discharged as undesirable after a state
court conviction of robbery. Later he was pardoned and thereafter was committed
to a mental institution. The Air Force Discharge Review Board and the Board for the
Correction of Military Records each denied his application for a change of his dis-
charge; and he also was unsuccessful in his court action.
83 Hirshberg v. Cooke, 386 U.S. 210 (1949); see United States v. Gallagher, 7
U.S.C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957).
8, Harmon v. Brucker, 855 U.S. 579 (1958); Murray v. United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 185
(1961); cf. Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965).
:5 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. V. (B.).
OId. para. V. (C.).
:
7 Id. para. VI. (B.). (Emphasis added.)
8 1962 Hearings 384-35.
"Id. at 22-28, 827-29 (Army), 889-92 (Navy), 927-28 (Air Force).
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verges from current practice by implying that the person receiving
the honorable discharge has rendered service of merit-service above
the average; in reality the honorable discharge is apparently issued
unless the serviceman being separated has rendered service which is
considerably below the average. Thus, a serviceman's receipt of a
general, rather than an honorable, discharge has far more serious
implications than would be perceived from the wording of the
directive.
A serviceman discharged for unsuitability may receive either an
honorable or a general discharge. If he has less than eight years
of continuous active military service, the directive provides him
the opportunity to make a written statement in his own behalf;90
if he has more than eight years of continuous active service, he is
considered to have such an equity in being retained on active duty
that he receives the same basic protections that would exist if he
were being considered for an undesirable discharge.0 1 These pro-
tections include the right to a hearing before an administrative dis-
charge board and representation by counsel.92
The administrative discharge board is to be comprised of at least
three officers, 'and it may include a nonvoting member. According
to the directive:
The board functions as an administrative rather than a judicial
body. Strict rules of evidence need not be observed. However, the
chairman may impose reasonable restrictions as to relevancy, com-
petency, and materiality of matters considered. When the board
meets in closed session, only voting members will be present. The
proceedings of the board will be maintained as prescribed by the
Secretary of the Military Department but as a minimum shall con-
tain a verbatim record of the findings and recommendations.03
The directive also provides that the respondent before an ad-
ministrative discharge board may: appear in person, with or without
counsel; challenge any voting member of the board for cause only;
request the appearance of pertinent witnesses-although no subpoena
power is available under present law to compel their attendance;
testify or not, as he chooses; and question any witness who does ap-
pear before the board.94
11 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. VIII. (C.)l.
9 1 Id. para. VIII. (C)2.
11 Id. paras. VIII.(C.)-(D.). See id. para. IV.(K.), defining "counsel."
"Id. para. IX.(B.).
91 Id. para. IX. (C.).
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It has already been noted here that the findings and recommen-
dations of the board are binding in some respects upon the dis-
charge authority; for instance, the discharge authority cannot over-
ride the board's recommendations by substituting a type of dis-
charge less favorable to the respondent serviceman than that which
the board recommended.9 5 However, the discharge authority can
separate a serviceman with an honorable or general discharge despite
the board's recommendation of retention.96 Suspending the execu-
tion of an approved discharge for a probationary period is another
alternative available to the discharge authority.97
When the newly-issued Department of Defense Directive on
administrative discharges is compared with the 1959 directive, which
was considered during the 1962 Senate hearings of the Ervin subcom-
mittee,98 several significant clarifications and additions for the
benefit of service personnel can be discerned. For example, rights
to a board hearing and to legally-trained counsel in connection with
that hearing have been broadened. The grounds for an undesirable
discharge have been rendered more specific and more uniform
for the different military departments. In this connection, the new
directive omits the authority under the 1959 directive to issue an
undesirable discharge for unfitness for "other good and sufficient
reasons when determined by the Secretary concerned."99 Require-
ments have been imposed for counselling the serviceman prior to
initiating administrative discharge proceedings against him, thus
providing him with a locus poenitentiae. Similarly, authority has
been given to suspend the administrative discharge during a pro-
bationary period. Greater confidence has been reposed in the ad-
ministrative discharge boards: their recommendations as to the
type of discharge can no longer be overruled or ignored by higher
military authorities to the detriment of the serviceman. And the
respondent is afforded greater procedural protection before the
boards. These changes, while implementing several of the recom-
9"Id. para. V. (A.)3. This limitation corresponded to the Air Force and Army
practice, but changed that of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. See note 71
supra.
00 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. V. (A.)4.
:
7 Id. para. X.
8"Administrative Discharges, Department of Defense Directive 1332.14, Jan. 14,
1959, quoted in 1962 Hearings 23.
"0 Department of Defense Directive 1332.14, Jan. 14, 1959, para. VII. (I.)6, quoted in
1962 Hearings 26. See 1963 SUMMARY-REPORT 3, which criticized the differences in
the definitions of "unfitness" among the various military departments.
Vol. 1966: 41]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
mendations of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 00 do not
include all of the reforms suggested by that subcommittee and later
embodied in Senator Ervin's legislative proposals. Moreover, as
will be discussed, the directive may not include all the safeguards
which are necessary under recent judicial decisions.
B. Safeguards After Discharge
Before turning to the role of the courts, it seems important to
examine the administrative remedies which are available to the
serviceman after discharge' 01-the remedies which it may be neces-
sary to exhaust before the aggrieved victim of administrative dis-
charge action can seek judicial relief.
Discharge review boards are established for each service under
10 U.S.C. § 1553 to review the discharge or dismissal of any former
member of the Armed Forces. 02 The statute provides that: "wit-
nesses shall be permitted to present testimony either in person or by
affidavit, and the person requesting review shall be allowed to ap-
pear before such board in person or by counsel.' 03 Thus, the
applicant for relief can automatically obtain a hearing before the
discharge review board of the military department concerned.
However, these boards, which are composed of military officers,
have no subpoena power to compel the attendance of witnesses
desired by the applicant; relief is available from such a board only
after the discharge has occurred; and no award of pay can be
made.X04
Title 10 of the United States Code also provides that:
The Secretary of a military department, under procedures estab-
lished by him and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and act-
ing through boards of civilians of the executive part of that mili-
tary department, may correct any military record of that depart-
100 See id. at 49-53.
101 The administrative remedy of application to a correction board established
under 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1964) may also be available prior to the issuance of the dis-
charge. See Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965), discussed in text
accompanying note 119 infra.
10 -"[O]ther than a discharge or dismissal by sentence of a general court-
martial .... 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (a) (1964).
100 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (c) (1964).
10 -Additionally, the Air Force Discharge Review Board "is not authorized to
revoke any discharge or dismissal, to reinstate any person in the military service
subsequent to his separation, or to recall any person to active duty." 32 C.F.R.
§ 865.101 (b) (1965).
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ment when he considers it necessary to correct an error or remove
an injustice. °5
These correction boards, which are composed of civilians serving
on a part time basis, do not grant hearings to an applicant as a
matter of right;10 6 and according to statistics presented in 1962 to
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 10 7 hearings are
frequently denied. The authority of these boards is not limited
to discharge matters: the relief forthcoming from them-subject
to approval by the secretary of the military department involved-
may extend to a change in the character of a discharge, complete
elimination of the discharge and restoration to duty, restoration of
rank, and elimination of derogatory information from an applicant's
military records.
Adopting a liberal construction of the power of the correction
boards and rejecting a contrary view of the Comptroller General,
the Court of Claims ruled recently that the Army Board for the
Correction of Military Records was empowered to correct not only
statements of fact but also "conclusions" contained in an applicant's
military records. 0 8 In upholding the authority of these boards to
correct an applicant's military records in so far as those records re-
flect erroneous or mistaken legal views and even though there
is no change in the hard facts recorded, the Court of Claims recog-
nized that the boards would afford a second forum-alternative
or additional to the courts-for consideration of what would other-
wise be conventional judicial claims. So long as the records contain
a mistake or omission, whether factual or legal, a correction board
may consider the matter; and it may recommend payment to the
applicant if the correction requires monetary relief.
10- 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1964).
1o Boland v. United States, Civil No. 556-58, Ct. Cl., Jan. 22, 1965, held that there
was no arbitrary action by a correction board in denying an oral hearing; a correction
board is empowered to deny applications without a hearing. Similarly, in Merson v.
United States, Civil No. 5-60, Ct. Cl., Oct. 15, 1965, the Court of Claims ruled that,
although a hearing might have been helpful, it was not required under 10 U.S.C. §
1552 (1964).
107See 1963 SuMMARY-REPORT 11-12; 1962 Hearings 863, 919, 954. Hearings were
granted in less than 20% of the cases, although in a substantial percentage of cases
relief was granted without a hearing. In his testimony at the January 1966 Senate
hearings, a Washington attorney, Mr. Neil Kabatchnick, reiterated his criticism voiced
in 1962 (see 1962 Hearings 513) concerning the correction boards' failure to grant
hearings as a matter of course; however, he conceded the need to provide a summary
procedure for disposing swiftly of applications for relief that were clearly frivolous or
without merit.
108 Oleson v. United States, Civil No. 376-64, Ct. Cl., July 16, 1965.
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A very recent case indicates that a correction board has not only
the authority but also the duty to recommend relief if the appli-
cant's legal rights have suffered at the hands of the military. In Ashe
v. McNamara 0 9 an ex-serviceman sought judicial relief after the
Board for the Correction of Naval Records had failed to recommend
corrective action regarding a punitive discharge imposed by a gen-
eral court-martial.1 0 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
ruled that since a clear violation of the serviceman's right to the
effective assistance of counsel had occurred during the trial by court-
martial, the Correction Board was under a duty to recommend a
correction of his records. The failure of the Board to perform this
duty could, in turn, be remedied by the courts. Although the case
itself concerned a punitive discharge, rather than military admin-
istrative action, the same duty would apparently exist for the cor-
rection boards to recommend correction of administrative action
which had violated the legal rights of the applicant.
Since 10 U.S.C. § 1552 refers to the secretary of a military de-
partment "acting through boards of civilians," there has been some
uncertainty concerning the scope of the authority possessed by the
secretary to reject the board's recommendation for correction of
an applicant's records. In Hertzog v. United States," the plaintiff
complained that on three separate occasions the Secretary of the
Army had arbitrarily rejected the Army Correction Board's recom-
mendation that his records be corrected to show a promotion. The
Court of Claims concluded that, in light of 10 U.S.C. § 1552 and
section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act,"12 arbitrary action
by either the Correction Board or the Secretary is subject to judicial
review. According to the court:
Where the Secretary in overturning the Correction Board's
recommendation goes outside the record and issues before the
Board for a basis for his decision, he must justify such a departure
by explicitly stating the "policy reasons" behind such action. In
the absence of such an explanation, we cannot determine upon
109 355 F.2d 277 (Ist Cir. 1965).
1 0 Ashe had been tried long before the enactment of the Uniform Code and thc
establishment of the Court of Military Appeals. Since the review of his conviction
had been completed under the Articles for the Government of the Navy, there ap-
parently was no procedure for review by the court.
'112 167 Ct. Cl. 377 (1964).
112 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
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review that his discretionary action was not "arbitrary or capri-
CiOUS."' 1 3
Since the Secretary of the Army had provided no justification for
rejecting the recommendation of the Correction Board, his action
was arbitrary; and the claimant was entitled to a judgment for the
back pay that he would have received if the Board's recommendation
had been followed.114 Thus, in practice, the power of a secretary
to reject the findings and recommendations of his correction boards
has been limited by the judicially imposed requirement that the
rejection be supported by the records and evidence before the
board, or by some explicitly stated policy reason. 115 The result of
this requirement is greater responsibility for the correction boards;
and presumably this greater responsibility will be reflected in
greater concern with the composition and procedures of these
boards." 6
A correction board generally will not consider a discharge case
until the applicant has exhausted his administrative remedies be-
fore the discharge review board of the same military department."17
If, however, the application for relief includes a request for action
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the discharge review board-
for example, an award of back pay-the applicant will apparently
be free to go directly to the correction board. The tactical choices
resulting from these rules concerning exhaustion have been de-
scribed in this way:
In a discharge case you may decide to apply first to the Discharge
Review Board and then later to the Correction Board; in this
way you are getting two chances to present your client's case. How-
ever, I would suspect that if a hearing already has taken place be-
113 167 Ct. Cl. at 387.
"I A dissent took the position that the Secretary of the Army had made a policy
decision against nunc pro tune promotions and that he was free to do so under 10
U.S.C. § 1552 (1964).
11r Hertzog v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 377 (1964); Betts v. United States, 145 Ct.
Cl. 530, 172 F. Supp. 450 (1959); Eicks v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 522, 172 F. Supp.
445 (1959); Proper v. United States, 139 Ct. Cl. 511, 154 F. Supp. 317 (1957).
110 Similarly, as greater responsibility is given to the administrative discharge
boards convened before issuance of the discharge-and as greater weight is given to
their findings and recommendations, so that they cannot be summarily ignored by
higher authorities (see 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. V. (A.))-greater attention
will be devoted to appointing qualified members to these boards. It is a truism that
the qualifications and abilities of a board's members frequently are in proportion to
the authority possessed by that board.
117 See, e.g., Air Force Reg. 31-3, para. 7.
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fore a Discharge Review Board, a Correction Board would be much
less likely to grant a hearing than if no prior hearing had occurred.
Thus, you may choose to word your client's application for relief
in such a way-by requesting back pay or other monetary relief-
that it will fall outside the jurisdiction of a Discharge Review
Board. Then it will be possible to go directly to the Correction
Board without pausing for proceedings before the Discharge Re-
view Board.118
Although the correction boards have been discussed as post-
discharge administrative remedies, there are some indications that
relief may be available from this source even before the discharge
has been issued. In Schwartz v. Covington,119 an Army enlisted man
sought declaratory and injunctive relief to restrain Army officials
from issuing him an undesirable discharge. The plaintiff had been
investigated in 1960 for alleged homosexuality; but after his en-
listment expired in 1961, he was reenlisted. Later there was a
further investigation, and in 1963 a hearing took place before an
administrative discharge board. The statements of five persons which
had been made in 1960 and which pertained to the plaintiff's acts
during a prior enlistment were received by the board over ob-
jection. This board recommended an undesirable discharge, where-
upon the plaintiff commenced his court action, alleging arbitrari-
ness on the part of military authorities and irreparable injury to
him if the discharge were issued. Affirming the ruling of the district
court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a stay
of discharge action pending completion of action by the Army Board
for the Correction of Military Records. Clearly the court con-
sidered that, although the Discharge Review Board could only act
after a discharge had been issued, the Correction Board was available
to the plaintiff even prior to discharge. Presumably the plaintiff's
application for relief would include a request for deletion from his
military records of all reference to acts in a prior enlistment and all
administrative proceedings which in any way were predicated on
such acts.
In McCurdy v. Zuckert,120 an Air Force master sergeant sought
an injunction against issuance of an administrative discharge predi-
"18Paper by Robinson 0. Everett, Administrative Discharges-A Private Practi-
tioner's Viewpoint, presented during the Federal Bar Association meeting, in Chicago,
Sept. 1965.
119 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965).
120 Civil No. 65-132, M.D. Fla., Nov. 4, 1965.
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cated on his alleged lewd and indecent acts and a character and be-
havior disorder. Apparently the district court assumed that the
plaintiff could seek relief from the Air Force Board for the Cor-
rection of Military Records without awaiting the issuance of a dis-
charge.
Presumably an application for relief to a correction board will
not halt or delay administrative discharge proceedings which are
underway. Otherwise, in light of the time usually necessary for the
correction boards to process an application,121 discharges could be
delayed for substantial periods of time by the mere filing of the
application. However, the availability of the correction board as a
forum prior to discharge may induce a court-as in Schwartz v.
Covington-to enjoin the issuance of an administrative discharge
until the board has acted.
II
THE JUDICIAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE
FOR CONTESTING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES
A. Expansion of Judicial Review
The traditional rule for review of courts-martial was that "the
single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction."'122 However, after the
Supreme Court ruled in Johnson v. Zerbst 23 that the jurisdiction of
a civil court might be lost because the defendant had been deprived
of his constitutional rights, the stage was set for a broader scope of
collateral attack on court-martial convictions. Finally, in Burns v.
Wilson,'12  the Court approved a broader standard of judicial re-
view of court-martial convictions-although still a more limited
judicial review than would take place in the event of collateral
attack on a state court conviction. 25 Furthermore, by establish-
121 See 1962 Hearings 833-34, 899, 931. The average time for review ranged from
four months for the Army Board for Correction of Military Records to eight months
for the Air Force Board.
-122 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950), quoting In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147,
150 (1890). See Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895); Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696
(1881); Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 65 (1857).
122 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
124 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
122 Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, writing for himself and for three other Justices, took the
position that the function of federal civil courts upon a military prisoner's application
for habeas corpus is limited to determining whether the military have given fair consid-
eration to each of the claims made in the application. Id. at 142. Only Mr. Justice Min-
ton was apparently willing to apply the traditional test-that is, whether the court-martial
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ment of the Court of Military Appeals, Congress provided a means
of direct review of court-martial action by a court composed of
civilians-a court which from the outset has demonstrated deep con-
cern for the constitutional rights of servicemen.
A somewhat parallel development has taken place in connection
with the judicial review of administrative discharge actions. Orig-
inally these discharges were considered to be completely insulated
from any civil court review.126 This insulation may have been one
reason for the trend toward substitution of administrative discharge
action for courts-martial after the Uniform Code became law.127
However, in Harmon v. Brucker,128 the Supreme Court allowed
judicial review of an administrative discharge and held that the
discharge had been issued illegally because it had been based on the
serviceman's preinduction conduct. Since then a number of suc-
cessful attacks on administrative discharge action have been made
in the courts.
B. The Court of Claims
The Court of Claims has provided one route for attack on dis-
charges. In this tribunal relief is limited to an award of money
damages; the Court of Claims cannot directly order either restora-
tion to duty or a change in the character of a discharge. 12 How-
ever, as a practical matter, a judgment for the plaintiff in the Court
of Claims will usually enable him to obtain any further appropriate
relief from the correction board; and absent such administrative
relief, the Court of Claims judgment would presumably give rise
to a collateral estoppel in the plaintiff's favor if he then instituted
further action in a district court.
The plaintiff in the Court of Claims will seek to recover pay and
had jurisdiction of the person accused and of the act charged, and acted within its
powers. Id. at 147 (concurring opinion).
In reviewing constitutional issues raised by a state prisoner, a federal district
court is not limited in its powers by the circumstance that state courts have already
considered these same issues and disposed of them adversely to the defendant. A
logical question is why courts-martial, which are ad hoe tribunals, should be more
insulated than state courts from collateral attack.
126 See, e.g., the views of the majority in Harmon v. Brucker, 243 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir.
1957), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); Sohm v. Dillon, 231 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C.
1964); cf. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
127 See 1962 Hearings 165.
22 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
120 See Meador, Judicial Determinations of Military Status, 72 YALt L.J. 1293 (1963)




allowances which have been forfeited without statutory authority
and in violation of the Government's obligations to him. He may
also allege in his petition a breach of any enlistment contract under
which he has served.130 The Government will apparently not be
allowed to defend that, subsequent to plaintiff's discharge, he has
not rendered the military services contemplated under the enlist-
ment.1' 1 However, the recovery is subject to a setoff for any wages
earned in private employment. 32  The recovery of back pay by
reason of an unlawful discharge will extend only through the term
of the original enlistment and not up to the date of judgment; but,
if the plaintiff had been serving under an enlistment for an indefinite
period, then back pay would apparently be recoverable up to the
date of judgment in the Court of Claims.
133
An interesting variation of this principle was involved in a case
where the Court of Claims ruled that the plaintiff-WAF had been
discharged as undesirable in violation of the Air Force's own regu-
lations. 3 4 The Government contended that, even if the discharge
had been ineffective for some purposes, it was effective to terminate
the WAF's entitlement to pay, since she was a reservist who was
subject to release from active duty at any time. Relying on the
13o See McAulay v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 359, 305 F.2d 836 (1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 938 (1963); Murray v. United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 185 (1961). In the latter case,
Murray's counsel (the present writer) alleged that the Air Force, by its arbitrary and
unlawful discharge of the plaintiff, had committed a breach of his enlistment contract,
and that the damages should include not only any back pay that had accrued after his
discharge but also the commuted value of the retirement benefits of which plaintiff had
been deprived by the Government's repudiation of its contract. The court acquiesced
in part in these contentions.
131 See Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393 (1961).
232 Garner v. United States, 161 Ct. Ca. 73 (1963); Clackum v. United States, 148
Ct. Cl. 404, 296 F.2d 226 (1960). The allowance of the setoff corresponds to the
principle governing the recovery of back pay by employees whose loss of a job results
from an unfair labor practice, as determined by the National Labor Relations Board.
See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); 31 Ar. JUR., Labor § 311 (1958).
In Murray v. United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 185 (1961), the plaintiff had received substantial
veterans benefits from the Veterans Administration by reason of physical disability
after his unlawful discharge from the Air Force. An effort was made to invoke the
"collateral source" rule and argue that no setoff should be allowed since the disability
benefits differed from wages; but the Commissioner had not accepted this view and it
was not pressed before the Court of Claims. But cf. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 840 U.S.
361 (1951).
13 Smith v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 682 (1961); Murray v. United States, supra
note 132; Clackum v. United States, supra note 132; In Garner v. United States, supra
note 132, the plaintiff had been serving under an enlistment for an indefinite period;
and therefore she was allowed to recover up through the date that an honorable dis-
charge had been issued her in place of her original discharge.
131 Clackum v. United States, supra note 132.
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clear principle of Vitarelli v. Seaton'85--where a similar argument
by the Government had been unsuccessful in connection with the
wrongful separation of a government employee who lacked either
civil service tenure or employment rights-the Court of Claims held
that the undesirable discharge issued to the WAF would not be
recognized for any purpose.
136
C. Action in a District Court
By reason of their concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Claims up to $10,000, the federal district courts can be used as a
forum for bringing an action in which back pay is sought.
8 7 More
frequently, however, the plaintiff will enter a district court either
a) to enjoin the issuance of a threatened discharge or b) to seek a
judgment declaring that the discharge he has received is unlawful
and void and ordering that he be reinstated and restored to duty.
In such cases the plaintiff, if he sought to sue in the federal
judicial district where he resided or was stationed, was formerly
often confronted with the objection that he had not joined as de-
fendant an indispensable party-namely, the secretary of the military
department. On the other hand, the plaintiff would often contend
that the relief he sought did not involve any exercise of discretion
and that, under the doctrine of Williams v. Fanning,38 it sufficed for
him to join as defendants the military commanders at a lower
echelon, upon whom he could obtain service of process. This con-
tention was more likely to succeed if the plaintiff were still in the
service and were seeking to enjoin his prospective discharge, rather
than to set aside an accomplished discharge and seek restoration to
duty; the restoration to duty would more probably be viewed as
involving an exercise of discretion at the secretarial level, so that
it would be necessary to have the secretary as a party defendant.
'-- 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
136 Clackum v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 404, 410, 296 F.2d 226, 229 (1960).
117 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1964), the district courts have concurrent juris-
diction with the Court of Claims up to $10,000. However, prior to 1964 the district
courts, unlike the Court of Claims, could not entertain "any civil action or claim to
recover fees, salary or compensation for official services of officers or employees of the
United States." Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 50(b), 65 Stat. 727. In 1964 this
limitation was removed. Act of Aug. 30, 1964, 78 Stat. 699 (1964). Apparently the
removal was prompted by the enactment in 1962 of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391 (1964),
which had made it feasible to sue in the district courts for reinstatement; it seemed
appropriate to authorize a means by which, in most cases, accompanying claims for
back pay could be disposed of in the same proceeding.
133 332 U.S. 490 (1947).
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Fortunately, Congress eliminated this entire problem in 1962
by enacting a statute providing:
A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or em-
ployee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his
official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of
the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought in any judicial district in which: (1) a defendant in the
action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real
property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff
resides if no real property is involved in the action.
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served
as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that
the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or agency
as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the
territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.139
In actions where the plaintiff sued in his own judicial district to
obtain restoration to duty and reinstatement or some similar relief
after discharge, he also formerly faced another difficulty: the relief
sought was in the nature of mandamus, and only the federal district
courts in the District of Columbia were deemed to possess authority
to issue writs of mandamus. Fortunately again, Congress removed
this obstacle in 1962 by providing:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action
in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to
the plaintiff.
140
This legislation did not create new duties or liabilities on the
part of the United States or its officials; but it made existing duties
enforceable without the necessity of bringing an action in the District
of Columbia.141 The combined effect of these two new provisions
was to make it unnecessary for an aggrieved serviceman or ex-
serviceman to come to Washington-to the Court of Claims or the
District Court there-in order to seek relief in a military discharge
case. By reason of these provisions it was possible for the plaintiff
in Ashe v. McNamara42 to commence in a federal district court in
-" 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) (1964).
141028 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964).
114 See, e.g., Application of James, 241 F. Supp. 858, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Seebach
v. Cullen, 224 F. Supp. 15, 17 (N.D. Cal. 1963), afl'd, 338 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 972 (1965).
142 355 F.2d 277 (lst Cir. 1965).
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Massachusetts, where he resided, the litigation by which he sought
judicial relief concerning his punitive discharge from the Navy.
The chief obstacle to judicial relief-especially prior to dis-
charge-will result from the doctrine that a plaintiff must exhaust
his administrative remedies. Thus, in Beard v. Stahr,143 the efforts
of an Army officer to enjoin the proceedings to separate him from
the service were thwarted by this doctrine. 144 And a number of
lower court decisions embody a similar view.145
However, in Reed v. Franke,146 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit indicated that, despite failure to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies, a district court might exercise jurisdiction to
decide substantial constitutional questions presented by a service-
man's claim that certain military procedures violated his consti-
tutional rights. The plaintiff had sought a permanent injunction
against the issuance to him of a general discharge for unsuitability
-allegedly demonstrated by his drinking and his court-martial con-
victions. The court bypassed the exhaustion issue, and concluded
on the merits that the regulations under which the discharge was to
be issued had been validly promulgated pursuant to statute, 47 and
143 370 U.S. 41 (1962) (per curiam). The Court stated that "if appellant is removed,
the Court is satisfied that adequate procedures for seeking redress will be open to him."
Id. at 32.
114 Beard was seeking relief prior to the action by the Secretary of the Army
on the board's recommendation that he be separated. Perhaps the legal issues would
have been quite different if the Secretary of the Army had already exercised his
discretion in favor of separating Beard before injunctive relief was sought. See McCurdy
v. Zuckert, Civil No. 65-132, M.D. Fla., Nov. 4, 1965.
'145See, e.g., Anderson v. McKenzie, 306 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1962); Michaelson v.
Herren, 242 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1957). A denial of relief on grounds of failure to ex-
haust administrative remedies does not bar judicial relief at a later time. See Bland
v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Bland v. Hartman, 245 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.
1957). In Kirk v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 738 (1964), the Court of Claims ruled that
the period of the statute of limitations was not tolled by reason of proceedings
pending in the Army Discharge Review Board; and, as a predicate for this cotclusion,
it stated that nothing in 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1964) requires that military personhel seek
review by such a board before suing on the basis of an invalid discharge. Kirk v.
United States, supra at 743. However, the Court of Claims has ruled that before a
suit is brought for disability retirement pay, the plaintiff must first exhaust his
administrative remedies by applying to the Retiring Board or the Physical Evalua-
tion Board for an administrative determination of the right to retire for physical
disability; and this is mandatory in the absence of extenuating circumstances. McAulay
v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 359, 305 F.2d 836 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 938 (1963).
In Krennrich v. United States, Civil No. 358-62, Ct. Cl., Jan. 22, 1965, the Court of
Claims held that a former FAA employee had no standing to claim that her removal
had been procedurally defective since she had failed to exhaust her remedy before
the Civil Service Commission.
1,8 297 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1961).
475 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). Under this statute the secretary of a department may
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that the remedy provided by Congress was constitutionally ade-
quate,148 even though it did not include a fact-finding hearing be-
fore discharge. Accordingly, the denial of the requested injunction
was affirmed.
In Schwartz v. Covington,'149 another court of appeals, in staying
issuance of a proposed undesirable discharge until the Army Board
for the Correction of Military Records could act on the plaintiff's
application for relief, noted that he had satisfied three basic re-
quirements: I) he had shown a likelihood that he would ultimately
prevail; 2) he had demonstrated that there would be irreparable
injury if he were discharged, even if he were later reinstated in the
Army; and 3) he had shown that, in light of his non-sensitive duties,
the Government would not suffer irreparable injury if the stay were
granted. 10 Apparently this court of appeals would attach consider-
able significance to the stigma that results from an undesirable dis-
charge, even if it is later revoked; and so the second condition-
that of irreparable injury to the plaintiff-would appear relatively
easy to satisfy. The injury to the Government from delaying the
discharge would depend in large part on the type of duties to which
the plaintiff would be assigned while further proceedings were
taking place. The likelihood of ultimate victory by the plaintiff
would depend on the facts of each case.
In McCurdy v. Zuckert,151 the plaintiff, an Air Force master ser-
geant, sought an injunction against a proposed general discharge for
unfitness. The Government moved to dismiss, arguing that the plain-
tiff had not exhausted the administrative remedies available in the
Discharge Review Board and Correction Board;152 and it contended
that these remedies would provide the plaintiff with full and com-
plete relief if he demonstrated that his discharge was illegal. The
district court distinguished Beard v. Stahr on the ground that in
that case further action by the Secretary of the Army in the exer-
cise of his discretionary authority was needed to separate the plain-
tiff, and the suit was hence premature; on the other hand, no
prescribe regulations for the government of his department; and in the court's opinion
this authority permits prescribing regulations concerning administrative discharges.
297 F.2d at.23. The regulations under attack came within this statutory authority.
11- 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552-53 (1964).
140 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965).
20 Id. at 538.
151 Civil No. 65-132, M.D. Fla., Nov. 4, 1965.
1r2 Such remedies are available under 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552-53 (1964).
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further act or decision by the Secretary of the Air Force would be
needed in order to separate Sergeant McCurdy.1 3 Furthermore,
the administrative remedies available to McCurdy were somewhat
limited: under Air Force regulations the Discharge Review Board
"is not authorized to revoke any discharge or dismissal, to reinstate
any person in the military service subsequent to his separation, or
to recall any person to active duty"; 154 and an applicant need not
even be granted a hearing by the Correction Board.
Citing an earlier case,' 55 the court concluded that plaintiff's omis-
sion to seek relief through the Correction Board did not deprive
the court of jurisdiction, but that, in its discretion, it might refrain
from exercising its jurisdiction pending exhaustion of administrative
remedies. In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction immedi-
ately and to enjoin issuance of the discharge, the district court con-
sidered that, under the tests of Schwartz v. Covington, it should
determine: 1) the existence of irreparable injury to plaintiff if the
requested relief were not granted; 2) substantial harm to other in-
terested persons; 3) harm to public interests; and 4) the likelihood
that the petitioner would prevail on the merits of the appeal.""
The court determined that if the plaintiff were discharged, he
would suffer irreparable injury to his reputation, even if subse-
quently the discharge action were corrected. Moreover, under the
particular circumstances of the case, exercising the court's jurisdic-
tion by staying the issuance of the discharge would not injure the
interests of others nor the public interest. However, the court
denied the injunction, concluding that the plaintiff had not satisfied
the fourth criterion: the court felt unable to make an affirmative
finding that plaintiff would likely prevail on the merits. The court
added:
That is not in any way a finding or an indication of any
opinion by this Court as to the truth or falsity of the charges
of lewd acts or of a character disorder, or whether or not plaintiff's
legal position that the AFR 39-17 procedure is in lieu of dis-
ciplinary action has merit. Rather it means only that such issues
are for determination by the Air Force in proper accordance with
legally established procedures which provide the plaintiff his
constitutional safeguards. Whether the procedure meets consti-
1'" McCurdy v. Zuckert, Civil No. 65-132, M.D. Fla., Nov. 4, 1965.
is' 82 C.F.R. § 865.101 (b) (1965).
'5 Ogden v. Zuckert, 298 F.2d 312, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
"' McCurdy v. Zuckert, Civil No. 65-182, M.D. Fla., Nov. 4, 1965.
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tutional tests and whether such procedure has been properly
followed here should first be ruled upon by a review board created
by Congress. Judicial review should await final administrative
action in this case.'
57
This pronouncement leaves unclear how a plaintiff satisfies a
court that there is a likelihood of his prevailing on the merits.
Apparently there is a strong judicial unwillingness to intervene in
such situations-even while asserting jurisdiction to grant relief.
The courts seem willing to concede that the receipt of an admin-
istrative discharge-even a general discharge, which is under hon-
orable conditions-may create irreparable injury to the recipient.
They do not seem disturbed by the fact that, if the discharge is en-
joined, the serviceman will continue to receive pay and allowances
while the case is pending final disposition. But in the exercise of
their discretion, the courts apparently do not wish to bypass the
boards which Congress has established.15s
III
GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL ATTACK
ON ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGE ACTION
A. Failure to Follow Regulations: Conflicts in Regulations
Violation by military authorities of their own regulations has
proved to be the most fruitful basis for attacking administrative
discharges in the courts. Even though these regulations would be
subject to change, they are binding until changed-binding even on
their authors. 59 Thus, discharges have been held invalid for such
things as: failure to give the serviceman the notice required by
naval regulations or to convene a medical board of survey also
required by these regulations; 160 non-adherence by an Air Force
separation board to that service's own regulations;' 6' or omission
of the opportunity for an officer to consult with counsel before sub-
mitting his resignation, as required by Air Force regulations. 162
1r7 Ibid.
"I8 These boards are established under 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552-53 (1964). The correction
boards have been viewed as having the authority to correct erroneous legal conclusions
as well as factual mistakes. See Oleson v. United States, Civil No. 376-64, Ct. Cl.,
July 16, 1965.150 Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 854 U.S. 363 (1957).
o Sofranoff v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 470 (1964); Smith v. United States, 155
Ct. Cl. 682 (1961).
161 Cole v. United States, Civil No. 112-63, Ct. Cl., June 11, 1965.
202 Ingalls v. Zuckert, 309 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1962). It has been held that due
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In Roberts v. Vance, 63 the plaintiff, a controversial reserve
officer with more than eighteen years of active federal service, had
been released from active duty on the personal order of the Secretary
of the Army. In setting aside this order, a court of appeals ruled
that the Secretary was bound by his own regulations, and that his
personal decision to release Roberts was not equivalent to the re-
view of the proposed release which was required by Army regu-
lations.
Another case involved a plaintiff who had accepted an un-
desirable discharge based on an alleged incident of sodomy.'"4 The
acceptance was apparently prompted by the threat of a general
court-martial for this same incident. Plaintiff was not informed,
however, that under the terms of a naval directive, special permission
would be required from the Secretary of the Navy in order to court-
martial him, since he had previously been acquitted of the same
offense by a state court. In allowing plaintiff to recover back pay
for the unexpired portion of his enlistment, the Court of Claims
ruled that the Navy's directive had been violated by the manner in
which plaintiff had been induced to accept the discharge, and that
the discharge, therefore, was void.
The leading case of Harmon v. Brucker,165 which established
the reviewability of administrative discharges, involved non-com-
pliance with military regulations by basing the discharge on con-
duct prior to induction. In another case the discharge was illegal
because it had been based on conduct in a prior enlistment, in viola-
tion of Air Force directives. 166 The Department of Defense Directive
issued on December 20, 1965, continues the rule that pre-service
and prior service activities will not be considered in determining the
process does not necessarily require that a serviceman be granted a hearing prior to
the issuance of an administrative discharge. See Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336
(D.C. Cir. 1963); Reed v. Franke, 297 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1961). However, if a regula-
tion requires that a hearing be granted before discharge, then non-compliance with
that regulation would render the discharge illegal and void.
'LG3 343 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1964). But cf. Unger v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 400,
326 F.2d 996 (1964).
104 Middleton v. United States, Civil No. 436-61, Ct. Cl., April 16, 1965; cf. Neal v.
United States, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2394 (Ct. Cl. Jan. 20, 1966).
"OS 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
'16 Murray v. United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 185 (1961). In Davis v. Stahr, 293 F.2d
860 (D.C. 1961), which involved the discharge of an inactive reservist, the court
reasoned that, just as preinduction conduct cannot be used to support a discharge,
the failure to disclose such conduct also should not be considered by an administrative
discharge board; otherwise the rule of Harmon v. Brucker could be readily bypassed.
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type and character of a discharge certificate; 67 however, it now au-
thorizes the consideration of such activities in determining whether
a serviceman shall be retained." 8
The courts have not accepted the contention that the enactment
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice preempted the field of mis-
conduct by servicemen and deprived the Armed Services of the
power to discharge on that basis. 69 Nor have they yet recognized
any right of a serviceman to request trial by court-martial for his
misconduct in lieu of administrative discharge proceedings. 170
Another possible line of attack on the use of administrative dis-
charges for misconduct is implicit in Sofranoff v. United States.'7'
The plaintiff, a Marine Corps master sergeant, had received a gen-
eral discharge after an incident of alleged child molestation and an
ensuing psychiatric examination. Sofranoff had demanded trial
by court-martial for the child molestation, but his request was not
granted. Ostensibly his discharge was for unsuitability and predi-
cated on schizoid personality traits. A Marine Corps directive
provided that enlisted personnel should not be recommended for
discharge for unsuitability as a punishment or in lieu of court-
martial. The Court of Claims reasoned that if the discharge were
really based upon child molestation, it would violate the prohibi-
tion against administrative discharge as a substitute for criminal
211 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. V. (B.).108 Id. para. V. (B.)- (C.). Cf. Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965),
involving a discharge board's consideration of alleged homosexual activities in a prior
enlistment together with a psychiatrist's opinion that the serviceman was a homo-
sexual. To what extent may testimony of prior misconduct in a prior enlistment
be used to substantiate an expert opinion as to the respondent serviceman's present
condition or to corroborate testimony as to similar misconduct during the present
period of service? See EvERETr, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES 211-15 (1956).
1 E.g., Rowe v. United States, 167 Ct. CI. 468 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961
(1965); Grant v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 600 (1963).
"1 0 Ibid. See also McCurdy v. Zuckert, Civil No. 65-132, M.D. Fla., Nov. 4, 1965;
Sofranoff v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 470 (1964). One of Senator Ervin's bills, S. 758,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), would allow a serviceman to elect trial by court-martial
in the event separation under other than honorable conditions is contemplated by
reason of specific acts of misconduct. This election has several parallels in military
law. Thus, Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 4, 10 U.S.C. § 804 (1964) grants an
officer dismissed by the President the election to demand trial by general court-
martial; art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1964) grants the option of trial by court-
martial instead of nonjudicial punishment; and art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964)
provides that an accused who has not been permitted to refuse punishment under
article 15 may object to trial by summary court-martial and be tried by special
or general court-martial.
'17 165 Ct. Cl. 470 (1964).
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action; and if it were based on a personality disorder, another Marine
Corps directive had been violated because of failure to convene a
medical board of survey. In either event the discharge was invalid,
and the plaintiff was entitled to back pay to the end of his enlist-
ment.
In an earlier case where a plaintiff had been given a general
discharge for unsuitability,172 the Court of Claims concluded that
the discharge could not have been issued because of any offense or
conviction; otherwise the discharge would have violated the pro-
vision of a Navy regulation that "'individuals shall not be recom-
mended for discharge for unsuitability as a punishment or in lieu
of court-martial.' "173
Since similar wording has appeared in several military directives
concerning administrative discharges, 74 the question is presented
as to when an administrative discharge is to be considered "in lieu
of" punishment or disciplinary action. In light of Sofranoff, it is
arguable that such wording in a directive precludes administrative
discharge of a serviceman by reason of misconduct for which he
has not been tried by court-martial. Such an interpretation would
protect the serviceman against the bypassing of safeguards provided
by Congress in the Uniform Code; and thus it might prove appeal-
ing to the courts. However, this interpretation-under which ad-
ministrative discharges for misconduct untried by court-martial
would be void-probably would result in a prompt change in the
applicable regulations.
B. Failure to Give Proper Effect to Collateral Proceedings
Sometimes criminal proceedings are initiated against a service-
man for the same alleged misconduct which is later used as the
basis for an administrative discharge. If the proceedings are in a
civil court and result in conviction of a serious offense, then that
conviction may itself be the basis for a discharge. 75 Unless the
1172Smith v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 682 (1961).
173 Id. at 687.
'74 E.g., Air Force Reg. 39-17, para. 1 (1959) provides as to proposed discharges
for unfitness that: "Commanders will not take action under this Regulation in lieu of
taking disciplinary action."
5 Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963); cf. Cook v. United States,
164 Ct. Cl. 438 (1964). Under 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. VII.(J.)l., dis-
charge with an undesirable discharge is authorized for conviction by civil authorities
-state, federal, or foreign-of an offense for which the maximum penalty under the
Uniform Code would be confinement in excess of one year or which involves moral
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conviction is later set aside on appeal76--or perhaps by a collateral
attack-the discharge will be valid.
If the civil court trial results in an acquittal, the Armed Services
are reluctant to court-martial the serviceman for the same miscon-
duct.177 However, they may seek to discharge him administratively
for this misconduct. 7 8  (Presumably the military do not wish to be
bound by the outcome in a forum where they cannot participate in
presenting the case against the defendant and where guilt must be
established beyond reasonable doubt pursuant to strict rules of
evidence.) In this situation there is apparently no bar to the ad-
ministrative discharge, 70 unless in some way military authorities
have violated their own regulations. s0
If the serviceman has been convicted in a court-martial, but his
sentence does not include a punitive discharge, then an objection
may be raised to the use of this conviction as the sole basis for an
administrative discharge-at least, if the discharge proposed is under
other than honorable conditions. The serviceman might argue that
the same issue has already been litigated between the Government
and the serviceman.181 But if the discharge proposed is an honor-
turpitude. Since the administrative discharge is not viewed as a punishment, there is
no double jeopardy problem, even though the civil conviction may have been in a
federal court. Conviction in a federal court of bribery automatically terminates the
convicted defendant's status as an officer in the Armed Services. Motto v. United
States, 348 F.2d 523 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
170 Cf. Jackson v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 183, 297 F.2d 939 (1962), cert. dis-
missed, 372 U.S. 950 (1963).
177 See 1962 Hearings 848, 909, 945. See also Middleton v. United States, Civil No.
436-61, Ct. Cl., April 16, 1965.
1178See Middleton v. United States, supra note 177.
270 If the acquittal was in a state court, then double jeopardy and res judicata
would not apply under traditional doctrine, since different sovereigns are involved.
Moreover, even if the acquittal has taken place in a federal civil court, there may be
difficulties in applying double jeopardy and collateral estoppel principles in view of the
differences in the types of proceeding involved and in the applicable burdens of proof.
For some cases where the separation of government employees was upheld despite their
acquittal in civil courts of the alleged misconduct on which the separation was predi-
cated, see Prater v. United States, Civil No. 217-63, Ct. Cl., July 16, 1965; Camero v.
United States, Civil No. 192-61, Ct. Cl., May 14, 1965; Finn v. United States, 152 Ct.
Cl. 1 (1961); cf. Cook v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 438 (1964). These cases would seem
fully applicable to administrative proceedings where a separation from the Armed
Services with an honorable discharge was contemplated. If an undesirable discharge
-or perhaps only a general discharge-were being proposed, the affixing of stigma
to the respondent might differentiate the situation from that of the government em-
ployee whose service is being terminated.
180 Middleton v. United States, Civil No. 436-61, Ct. Cl., April 16, 1965.
211 This would be true if the court-martial was one which had the power to impose
a punitive discharge. Under MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARnAL 79a, the "function of a
summary court-martial is to exercise justice promptly for relatively minor offenses
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able or general discharge for unsuitability-unsuitability which is
allegedly demonstrated by the conviction-then the situation is com-
plicated by the fact that a court-martial cannot sentence an ac-
cused to be separated honorably or under honorable conditions.
Of course, typically the conviction will not be used by itself as
a basis for discharge, but instead will be considered along with other
evidence which tends to establish a pattern of behavior. In this
event, the conviction is being given a legitimate collateral effect;
and the serviceman probably has little basis for complaint. 182
There have been instances of administrative discharge proceed-
ings based on the same charges-and even the same evidence-
which the Government had theretofore used unsuccessfully in a
court-martial prosecution.18 3 This practice seems highly undesirable




Command influence on courts-martial has been a major con-
cern of military justice. s5 Possibilities of such influence obviously
also exist over the members of administrative discharge boards-
whose members frequently are under the command of the officer
who appoints the board and who, therefore, are somewhat dependent
on him as to future assignments and promotions. The exercise of
under a simple form of procedure." (Emphasis added.) Since the offenses tried by a
summary court-martial are "relatively minor," they would not seem entitled to great
weight as a basis for an administrative discharge. Moreover, since the "simple form
of procedure" involved in the summary court-martial does not include a defense
counsel for the accused and involves a combination of the roles of judge, juror,
prosecutor, and defense attorney in the single summary court-martial officer, a con-
viction returned under such a procedure does not provide a strong basis for later
affixing to a serviceman the stigma of an undesirable discharge.
"'2 See note 40 supra. The habitual offender statutes also attach a legitimate col.
lateral consequence to a conviction by allowing the conviction to be considered later,
along with other convictions, as a basis for imposing a more severe punishment. See
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
113 The writer recalls one case involving an Army sergeant where apparently this
had taken place. Congressman Robert Michel of Illinois was among those who pro-
tested the injustice in this instance (see 109 CONG. REc. 16173 (1963)); and ultimately
the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records granted relief.
184 The stigma affixed by an undesirable discharge-or, to a lesser extent, by a
general discharge-might serve to differentiate these cases from those involving govern-
ment employees, where only termination of the right to pay is involved. See cases
cited note 179 supra.
188 See, e.g., EvERrr, op. cit. supra note 168, at 11-13, 166-68; Farmer & Wels, Com-




influence often allegedly takes place by means of a briefing which a
military commander has furnished to the board members before
the hearing. Such briefings as to relevant principles and policies
are not uncommon in military administrative proceedings.
In Cole v. United States,8 6 the Court of Claims considered the
plaintiff's contention that his separation from the Air Force was
wrongful because of command influence-allegedly by way of a
pre-hearing briefing by a high commander-exercised over the mem-
bers of the board before which he had sought to show cause why he
should be retained in the service. In comments which might be
described variously as dicta or as an alternative holding, the Court
of Claims made clear its disapproval of this practice by stating that
the briefing "jeopardized plaintiff's rights to that due process which
the Fifth Amendment extends to military personnel."'18 7
Similar briefings are specifically authorized by the Manual for
Courts-Martial for use in instructing personnel of courts-martial, 88
and the Court of Military Appeals has declined to disallow the
practice.:s Since the rights of an accused before a court-martial
seem at least as broad as those of a respondent before a board which
is considering his administrative separation, it is hard to reconcile
the pronouncement by the Court of Claims in Cole with the coun-
tenancing of pre-trial instruction of court-martial members.
D. Lack of Fair Hearing: Right to Counsel, Confrontation, and
Cross-Examination
Because of the stigma and other serious consequences resulting
from an undesirable discharge, it can be argued that the respondent
must be furnished with legally-trained counsel. 90 If the grounds
for discharge stated in the applicable regulation seem vague, a due
process objection might be raised on this ground-although mili-
tary law has long been tolerant of considerable vagueness.' 91 How-
18 Civil No. 112-63, Ct. Cl., June 11, 1965.
187 Ibid.
188 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 38.
210 United States v. Danzine, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 350, 30 C.M.R. 350 (1961). However,
one branch of the service, the Army, later determined to eliminate pre-trial instructions
to court-martial members. 1962 Hearings 869-70.
100 Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938); Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965). But Cf. LeBallister v.
Warden, 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33
C.M.R. 411 (1963).
101 In upholding the discharge of a West Point cadet who had been found guilty
of "quibbling" in violation of the Cadet Honor Code, the court of appeals rejected
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ever, probably one of the most promising means of challenge to ad-
ministrative discharge action concerns the rights of confrontation
and cross-examination.
To some extent the courts are reluctant to hold that rights of
confrontation have been curtailed by military regulations unless the
curtailment was clearly directed by the regulations and the regula-
tions, in turn, were clearly within the authority given to military
authorities by the Congress.192 However, Judge Holtzoff's recent
opinion in Gamage v. Zuckert'9 3 poses a more fundamental chal-
lenge to military administrative discharge proceedings. The separa-
tion from service which was being contested there followed an ap-
pearance by the plaintiff before an Air Force board of officers to
show cause why he should be retained in the service. Among other
things he had allegedly falsified weather reports-presumably in
order to improve nunc pro tunc his record as a weather observer
and prognosticator.
Judge Holtzoff reasoned that, although common law rules of
evidence are not required in these show-cause hearings, the re-
quirements of a "fair hearing" bar use in evidence of ex parte ac-
cusatory statements of witnesses who are not produced to testify
orally or by deposition. 94 The court emphasized that "this in-
volves a very serious charge, namely, falsification of records."'96r
The statute under which the separation had been initiated re-
quires a "fair and impartial hearing,"'9g6 and the court concluded
that confrontation of witnesses is a vital part of a "fair hearing."'197
Nor did Judge Holtzoff seem disturbed by the fact that the board of
officers before which the plaintiff had appeared lacked subpoena
power and therefore could not compel the appearance in court of
the attack of vagueness by saying that "we feel sure that it is not the province of a
court to determine what conduct is condemned, and what is not, by the 'common
law' of the Corps of Cadets-a creature of the Cadets themselves." Dunmar v. Ailes,
348 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Cf. Carter v. McLaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 401 (1902).
For another area in which the military "common law" has been operative, see Everett,
Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice-A Study in Vagueness, 37 N.C.L. Rzv.
142 (1959).
192 Cf. Davis v. Stahr, 293 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
103 Civil No. 1124-64, D.D.C., Nov. 9, 1965. Concerning the use of depositions in
courts-martial, see Everett, The Role of the Deposition in Military Justice, Military
L. Rev., Jan. 1960, p. 131.
291 Gamage v. Zuckert, Civil No. 1124-64, D.D.C., Nov. 9, 1965.
"95 Ibid.
19- 10 U.S.C. § 8782 (b) (1964).
1 97 Gamage v. Zuckert, Civil No. 1124-64, D.D.C., Nov. 9, 1965.
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any unwilling witnesses. Apparently the court considered that if
the absence of the subpoena power created problems in providing
confrontation, then Congress could enact suitable legislation ex-
tending the subpoena power to boards of this type.
Although the court predicated its result upon the statutory re-
quirement of a "fair and impartial hearing," one could hardly con-
tend that any requirement of a hearing-whether in a statute or a
regulation-envisaged less than a "fair and impartial" hearing.198
Thus, the doctrine of Gamage v. Zuckert, if accepted by other
courts, would seem broadly applicable to administrative discharge
proceedings-except in the decreasing number of instances where
military regulations grant no hearing at all to the serviceman being
considered for discharge.
Of course, in invoking the right of confrontation, a respondent
may be subject to requirements that he make efforts of his own to
obtain a witness' presence before any burden is placed on the Govern-
ment to do so.199 However, in light of Gamage, the respondent who
takes the proper procedural steps will apparently be able to insist
on being allowed to cross-examine any witness whose testimony or
statement is being used to establish misconduct on his part. Since
an administrative discharge board lacks the subpoena power pos-
sessed by courts-martial, 20 0 the respondent's insistence on confronta-
tion of witnesses who are not subject either to subpoena or to military
orders and who will not testify voluntarily may require that military
authorities prefer charges for trial by court-martial-where the wit-
nesses can be obtained by subpoena. Thus, the newly-recognized
requirements of confrontation are helping to reverse the pendulum
that once swung towards the use of administrative discharges in lieu
of court-martial action.
If a right of confrontation is recognized in some administrative
discharge hearings, must it be recognized in all such hearings; or can
it be limited only to those where the discharge is being proposed
by reason of misconduct? Would this right exist, for example, where
the respondent was being considered for separation because of un-
suitability or substandard performance? The Gamage opinion does
198 Cf. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
100 Cf. Williams v. Zuckert, 372 U.S. 765, dismissal of cert. vacated per curiam,
372 U.S. 765 (1963); Hanifan v. United States, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2358 (Ct. Cl., Dec. 17,
1965); DeNigris v. United States, Civil No. 18-63, Ct. Cl., Feb. 19, 1965.
200 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 47, 10 U.S.C. § 847 (1964).
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not give a clear answer to these questions. Of course, if confronta-
tion is read into the requirement of a "hearing" in all statutes
and regulations pertaining to military administrative discharges, the
same interpretation could also be advanced with respect to hearings
authorized by statute or regulation in connection with separations
and other personnel actions affecting civilian government em-
ployees.
E. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The constitutional safeguard against cruel and unusual punish-
ments might not support the argument that an administrative dis-
charge had been totally disproportionate to the misconduct or de-
ficiencies on which it was based. However, in particular cases it
might be argued that the discharge was so out of proportion to the
offense as to be completely beyond the contemplation of the regu-
lations under which the discharge had purportedly been issued.
Support for this position could be derived from cases recognizing
that the separation of a government employee for a minor infraction
after many years of good service may be arbitrary and capricious.
201
Fortunately, the requirements of counselling that have been im-
posed by the most recent Department of Defense Directive
2 2 will
help avoid the issuance of discharges that seem arbitrary and ca-
pricious when measured against the respondent's failures.
At one time the Government contended that the issuance of a
general discharge, which is a discharge under honorable conditions,
does not prejudice a serviceman in any way and therefore should not
be deemed subject to judicial relief.20 3 This position has long since
been repudiated by the courts; 204 indeed, in the leading case of
Harmon v. Brucker,205 the serviceman had been discharged with a
general discharge. However, it is still unclear whether the same
grounds of attack are available with respect to a general discharge
as would exist with respect to an undesirable discharge. And does
201 Clark v. United States, 162 Ct. C. 477 (1963). See also DeNigris v. United
States, Civil No. 18-63, Ct. CL., Feb. 19, 1965.
202 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. V. (A.)I.
203 See Ives v. Franke, 271 F.2d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 965 (1960).
20, Davis v. Stahr, 293 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Sofranoff v. United States, 165
Ct. Cl. 470 (1964); Murray v. United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 185, 187-88 (1961).
202 243 F.2d 613, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
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the answer depend on the purported basis for the general dis-
charge?
206
If a discharge is successfully attacked and is held void, then it is
void for all purposes. 20 7 It does not serve to terminate pay and al-
lowances, even though military authorities, in their discretion, could
readily have taken action which would have terminated the service-
man's military status and right to pay.208
IV
THE ERVIN LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Some of Senator Ervin's eighteen bills which would change
procedures used in connection with administrative discharges and
military justice may have been considered revolutionary and drastic
by the Armed Services when they were originally introduced in
1963. However, in light of some of the recent court decisions in
this area, a thorough examination of these proposals reveals that
today they can hardly be characterized by anyone as extreme.
The first of these bills, S. 745, would amend the Uniform Code
to establish by statute for each service branch an independent field
judiciary for general courts-martial. The members of this judiciary
would be officers209 called "military judges" 210 whose primary duty
would be as law officers of general courts-martial. They would be
insulated from control of the commanders appointing them. A
200 It might be argued that the general discharge must be surrounded by the same
safeguards available in the case of the undesirable discharge if the general discharge
is to be predicated on misconduct. This is analogous to the view sometimes taken that
an offense can be infamous, or can involve moral turpitude, regardless of the punish-
ment that can be imposed for its commission.
207 Middleton v. United States, Civil No. 436-61, Ct. Cl., April 16, 1965; Motto v.
United States, 348 F.2d 523 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Clackum v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 404,
296 F.2d 226 (1960). On the other hand, it is possible to have the character of a
discharge changed without affecting in any way the fact of discharge. Unger v. United
States, 164 Ct. Cl. 400, 326 F.2d 996 (1964).
208Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959); Clackum v. United States, supra
note 207, at 410, 296 F.2d at 229.
20 S. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, at 2 (1965). The bill would also authorize the
use of civilians as law officers ("military judges'). The Department of Defense has
indicated opposition to this alternative-apparently, in part, on the theory that it
represents an implied criticism of the lawyer in uniform.
210 S. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965). This change of title is designed to en-
hance the prestige of the law officer. Moreover, it conforms with the pronouncements
of the Court of Military Appeals to the general effect that the powers and duties
of law officers of general courts-martial should be assimilated as much as practicable
to those of federal district judges. See Miller, Who Made the Law Officer a "Federal
Judge"?, Military L. Rev., April 1959, p. 39.
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system of this type has already been established by the Army and
the Navy under their own directives, and has greatly improved the
efficiency of their military justice operations.21' The Air Force has
declined to create a field judiciary because of an anticipated adverse
effect on the flexibility considered desirable by that service in dealing
with military legal personnel.
This proposal represents an attempt to bring courts-martial and
their procedures more into line with civilian practice by providing
them with a real "judge." Although S. 745 does not deal with
administrative discharges, it should establish some precedent for
providing an independent legal adviser-like a judge-to preside
over the hearings of administrative discharge boards, whose findings
and recommendations-especially if an undesirable discharge is in-
volved-may have quite serious implications for the respondent
serviceman.
One possible goal would be the creation of an inter-service field
judiciary from which would be chosen persons to preside not only
over general courts-martial but also over special courts-martial, if a
bad conduct discharge is to be adjudged, and over administrative
discharge boards considering issuance of undesirable discharges.
The members of this judiciary would be insulated from the control
of military commanders in the field and, in the instance of mili-
tary officers, 212 their effectiveness reports-used for determining pro-
motions, transfers, and assignments-would be prepared under pro-
cedures designed to insulate them from possible command in-
fluence.
Creation of a Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps is authorized
by S. 746; the purpose of this bill would be to improve the status
and quality of the Navy's uniformed attorneys. Presumably such
improvement would benefit the quality of representation provided to
respondents in administrative discharge matters.
Under S. 747 a unified Department of Defense Board for the
Correction of Military Records would be substituted for the separate
boards now authorized for each military department.21 3 The Board
221 In the Army this system reduced law officer error from 4% to 1.2%; in the
Navy and Marine Corps from 8.7% to approximately 2%. See 1963 SUMARY-REPORT
27. See also Wiener, The Army's Field Judiciary System: A Notable Advance, 46
A.B.A.J. 1178 (1960).
212 Under the present wording of S. 745 civilians could also serve in the field
judiciary. See note 209 supra.
221 Separate boards are authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1964).
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members would serve on a full time basis, rather than part time as
under the present practice; they would be appointed to three year
terms.214 The purpose of this bill is to provide greater uniformity
among the service branches in the review of administrative dis-
charges and other personnel actions,215 as well as to enhance the
prestige, independence and responsibility of the correction boards.
Since the courts have already enhanced the responsibility and power
of the correction boards,216 S. 747 seems in line with present judicial
thinking.
Improved procedures for the review of courts-martial are the
sole concern of S. 748;217 but S. 749 pertains to both military justice
and administrative discharges. It amends article 37 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice218 by extending the prohibition of acts
producing command influence to include certain types of conduct
which might affect the efforts of counsel or the fairness of the triers
of fact.21.9 The pre-trial lectures for court members, heretofore
authorized by the Manual for Courts-Martial,220 would be forbid-
den. For the first time the statutory prohibition of command in-
fluence would apply to the exercise of such influence on administra-
tive boards-including discharge and separation boards and those
other boards whose proceedings relate to demotion or reduction in
grade, "or to any matter materially affecting the status or rights of
214 S. 747, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1965). The initial appointments would be for
staggered terms so that the terms of office would not all expire simultaneously. Ibid.
21rIn the field of defense procurement, the handling of contract appeals has been
unified by creation of an Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. Perhaps this
constitutes a precedent for S. 747. Senator Ervin has not introduced any legislation
to consolidate or unify the discharge review boards established under 10 U.S.C. § 1553
(1964) in each military department. Probably he considers that there is more justifi-
cation for maintaining the separation of these boards, whose members are uniformed
military personnel, than for maintaining the separation of the correction boards, whose
members are all civilians.
216 See, e.g., Oleson v. United States, Civil No. 376-64, Ct. Cl., July 16, 1965; Hertzog
v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 377 (1964).
217 This bill would reconstitute the "boards of review" established under Uniform
Code of Military Justice art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964), as "courts of military review,"
which would then each have a civilian chairman. S. 748, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-3
(1965). This bill has been severely criticized by the Armed Services on the ground,
inter alia, that it is a gratuitous insult to military lawyers and would deprive these
lawyers of desirable assignments.
28 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1964).
210 For example, it proscribes the use of effectiveness reports as a lever for exerting
command influence on defense counsel. S. 749, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).220 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 38. This provision was upheld by a two-to-one
vote in the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Danzine, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 350,
30 C.M.R. 350 (1961).
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any member of the armed forces."'22' The impact of extending the
statutory prohibition against command influence to include ad-
ministrative proceedings is somewhat diminished by the fact that the
Court of Claims has already indicated in Cole v. United States
222
that, even absent any statutory prohibition, pre-trial lectures to board
members and similar exercises of command influence threaten the
serviceman respondent's constitutional right to due process.
Under S. 750 legally-qualified counsel, within the meaning of
article 27 (b) of the Uniform Code, 223 must be provided an accused
as a prerequisite for the adjudging of a bad conduct discharge by a
special court-martial. Similarly, such counsel must be afforded to
any member of the Armed Forces whom it is proposed to separate
administratively from the service under conditions other than
honorable; and a board must be convened where the serviceman can
present evidence in his own behalf. Although the bill does not use
the term "fair and impartial hearing," or even the word "hearing,"
the requirement that the serviceman be "afforded an opportunity to
appear and present evidence in his own behalf before a board con-
vened by appropriate authority 224 might well be considered as legally
equivalent to the requirement of a "fair and impartial hearing."
In that event, it would be possible to apply the reasoning of Judge
Holtzoff in Gamage v. Zuckert,22 and to conclude that, by reason
of the statutory requirement-whether or not it is constitutionally
necessary-a respondent must be provided the opportunity to con-
front and cross-examine those whose derogatory statements or
affidavits will be considered against him by the board.
The Department of Defense Directive issued on December 20,
1965, requires that a serviceman being considered for discharge
under conditions other than honorable be "afforded the right to
present his case before an administrative discharge board" with the
advice and assistance of legally-qualified counsel.22 6 The directive
allows an escape from this requirement, however, where it can
properly be certified that legally-qualified counsel is not available;
227
221 S. 749, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
-222 Civil No. 112-63, Ct. Cl., June 11, 1965.
"2 10 U.S.C. § 827 (b) (1964).
224 S. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (a), at 2 (1965).
222 Civil No. 1124-64, D.D.C., Nov. 9, 1965.
220 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive paras. IV. (K.), V. (A.)2.
227 Id. para. IV. (K.).
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but S. 750 has no such exception to the requirement of an at-
torney.
228
The serviceman's "right to present his case before an admin-
istrative discharge board" is probably susceptible of the same
interpretation as the requirement of a "fair and impartial hearing"
which was construed in Gamage v. Zuckert. The directive provides
the protections of legally-qualified counsel and a hearing to a
serviceman with "eight or more years of continuous active military
service" who is being considered for a general or honorable dis-
charge by reason of unsuitability.22 9 On the other hand, S. 750
would apply only to proceedings that might lead to an undesirable
discharge and would not protect the serviceman who is being con-
sidered for a general or honorable discharge, irrespective of his
prior military service. Of course, another most important distinction
between the directive and the statute-a distinction adverted to by
some of the witnesses at the January 1966 Senate hearings-is that a
directive can be amended or changed much more readily than a
statute.
S. 751 and S. 752 concern only military justice, rather than ad-
ministrative discharges. 230 Conversely, S. 753 involves only military
administrative action and proposes an amendment of article 67
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice231 which would empower
2- There is an exception to the operation of this bill "in time of war if the
Secretary concerned suspends the operation of such subsection." S. 750, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 2 (a), at 2-3 (1965). Under the Uniform Code certain results hinge on the
existence or nonexistence of "time of war"; and questions have arisen as to whether
"time of war" requires a formal declaration of war or might be satisfied by a "police
action" or other large scale conflict. See EvRTr, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 25, 29-30, 53, 173, 186 (1956). At the January 1966
hearings the Judge Advocate General of the Navy indicated that, if "time of war"
were to be used as the basis of any exception, it might be wise to specify what is
meant by the term. There were other suggestions to the effect that the exception
should apply not only to time of war but also to periods of properly-declared national
emergency; and some comments were heard that no exception should exist, even
in wartime.
22 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive paras. VIII. (C.)2., (D.)l.
230 S. 751, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965), would extend from one year to two years
the period of time for submitting a petition for new trial; and it would also extend
the category of cases in which such a petition would be available. S. 752, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2, at 2 (1965), among other things, authorizes a court-martial to be com-
posed of a single qualified law officer if the accused consents thereto. The efficiencies
that would result from this bill and several others pertaining to courts-martial would
make it much less onerous to resort to criminal proceedings in the military. This,
in turn, would relieve some of the pressure to use administrative discharge pro-
ceedings in lieu of courts-martial.
2-31 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964).
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the Court of Military Appeals to review matters of law involved in
cases that have been considered by either the discharge review
boards232 or the correction boards. 233 Thus, just as the Court of
Military Appeals now rules on matters of law presented by courts-
martial which are reviewed by the boards of review, it would be
granted authority by S. 753 to review questions of law presented
in the cases which have reached the discharge review boards or the
correction boards.
The concept of judicial review in such cases is no longer a novel
one; the earlier discussion of judicial remedies for administrative
discharge action 234 should have made clear that review is already
available through the Court of Claims or the federal district courts.
Thus, the question arises whether the Court of Military Appeals
should either be added to, or substituted for, the civil tribunals which
already can accomplish this judicial review. S. 753 proposes that the
Court of Military Appeals "shall have exclusive jurisdiction with
respect to the review of cases brought before" 235 a discharge review
board or a correction board. In light of exhaustion requirements,
this provision would substantially curtail the opportunity of plain-
tiffs to bring suit in other courts-even suits seeking injunctions
against proposed discharges. During the 1966 hearings criticisms
were voiced that any such exclusive jurisdiction requirement, cen-
tralizing review in the Court of Military Appeals, would run counter
to the policy embodied in the recent statutes which enable a plain-
tiff to sue government officials in the federal court district where
he resides.2 36 Objections were also expressed that the Court of
Military Appeals already has a sufficient workload with military
justice matters, and that those provisions of S. 753 which contemplate
making appellate defense counsel available to the serviceman 23 7
would create a heavy, new workload for both the Armed Services and
the Court of Military Appeals. Of course, to the extent that military
authorities are being caused by current judicial decisions to turn
from administrative discharge action to trials by court-martial,
separations of military personnel for misconduct are already being
232 These boards are established under 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1964).
233 These boards are established under 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1964).
23 See part II of this article supra.
21 S. 753, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965).
2-- 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391 (e); see text accompanying notes 138-42 supra.
21 Appellate defense counsel is already provided for in military justice matters by
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 70, 10 U.S.C. § 870 (1964).
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disposed of in a manner which will permit their review by the court.
No separation of military personnel would be allowed under
S. 754 unless the serviceman to be separated had "been accorded
a hearing . . . before a board of officers convened for the specific
purpose of determining whether such person should be separated
or discharged under such conditions," 238 and "the board, on the
basis of the testimony and evidence presented at such hearing has
recommended that such person be so separated or discharged." 23 9
The term "hearing" would seem to include the concept of a "fair
and impartial hearing"; and thus it would authorize the interpreta-
tion used by Judge Holtzoff in Gamage v. Zuckert.
The prohibition of an undesirable discharge unless the discharge
board has so recommended corresponds to a limitation on un-
desirable discharges contained in the new Department of Defense
Directive.2 40 Since S. 753 provides that the board's recommendation
must be "on the basis of the testimony and evidence presented at
such hearing,"241 a question might be raised as to whether the word-
ing of this bill would forbid the present procedure for show-cause
hearings in cases where such hearings might result in an undesirable
discharge. Under the present procedure the burden of producing
evidence, and perhaps also the burden of persuasion, is placed on
the respondent by reason of information which has already been
considered by military authorities prior to the hearing. This in-
formation may lead to an undesirable discharge unless the respon-
dent meets his burden; and so to some extent the result of the hear-
ing and the board's recommendation hinge on evidence which has
not been presented at the hearing.
Utilization of a law officer-a person competent to act as the
law officer of a general court-martial242-would also be required by
S. 754 for any board which might recommend a discharge under
other than honorable conditions. In presenting this bill, Senator
Ervin undoubtedly contemplated that an administrative discharge
board would be much more able to protect the rights of the re-
spondent serviceman if it were presided over by an experienced
lawyer. Moreover, since S. 754 also requires that the respondent
'Is S. 754, 89th Cong., ist Sess. 1-2 (1965).
210 S. 754, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
'40 See 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. V. (A.)2.
2" S. 754, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
24' Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1964).
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be furnished with legally-qualified counsel, it seems that this right
to counsel would mean far more if the hearings were presided over
by a "judge." Of course, the presence of the "judge" would not
necessarily require that an administrative discharge proceeding be
conducted under the same rules of evidence applied in a court-
martial.
The Armed Services have not favored the enactment of S. 754;
undoubtedly they fear that the presence of a law officer or "judge"
might result in the excessive application of technical legal rules and
that, therefore, it would be all the more difficult to use the admin-
istrative discharge quickly and effectively. However, in view of
recent judicial decisions which have increased the vulnerability of
administrative discharge action, there is a substantial risk that legal
error will creep in and invalidate the administrative discharge in any
proceeding where there is no law officer to preside. In short, the
more technical rules that are rapidly emerging with respect to ad-
ministrative discharges may ultimately make it necessary that an
attorney preside over the proceedings and apply those rules prop-
erly.
243
If a law officer is to preside over military administrative dis-
charge proceedings-at least, in cases where a recommendation of
an undesirable discharge is possible-there will be a need to assure
his independence and technical proficiency. Just as such needs
gave rise to the field judiciary system used by the Army and Navy in
trials by general court-martial, and for which statutory sanction
has now been proposed by Senator Ervin,24 4 some type of field
judiciary may also be needed for administrative discharge boards.
In that event, the logical answer would be to consolidate the field
judiciary in such a way that a "military judge" who was part of this
judiciary might preside over either a court-martial or an ad-
ministrative discharge hearing.
Under S. 755 no member of a board of review established under
article 66 of the Uniform Code245 to review trials by court-martial
would be allowed to prepare an effectiveness report with respect
to any other member. This practice, which at one time existed in
the Army 246 and still existed in the Air Force at the time of the
243 See 1963 SUMfARY-REPORT 8.
"S. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); see text accompanying notes 209-11 supra.
10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964).
214 See 1963 SUMMARY-REPoRT 21. In the Army this practice was discontinued on
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January 1966 Senate hearings, allows the chairman of a board to
affect materially the military career of other members, and thus
presents some threat to the independence of those other members.
The prohibition contained in S. 755 applies only to one kind of
board: one created pursuant to article 66 of the Uniform Code.
2 47
However, the same principle might appropriately be applied by
statute to other boards as well,248 including any boards which con-
sider or review administrative discharge action.
Because of the stigma and other serious consequences involved
in a discharge under other than honorable conditions, Senator Ervin
has proposed that double jeopardy concepts be extended by statute
to bar certain administrative action. Thus, S. 756 would amend
article 44 of the Uniform Code249 to preclude an undesirable dis-
charge based in whole or in part on alleged misconduct for which
the prospective respondent has previously been tried and acquitted
by court-martial. However, the proposed legislation would not limit
use of the alleged misconduct, even after an acquittal, as the basis
for separation action under honorable conditions-that is, an hon-
orable or general discharge. Moreover, under S. 756 acquittal in a
civil court, whether federal, state, or foreign, would not preclude
basing an undesirable discharge on the same alleged offense of which
the respondent had been acquitted.
At one time a commander who was displeased with the findings
and recommendations of an administrative discharge board which he
had convened was free to refer the matter to a second board; that
board might then return new findings and recommendations that
were far less favorable to the respondent, even if the evidence before
the two boards were substantially the same. S. 756 would prohibit
this practice, but apparently only in circumstances where the pro-
posed discharge is to be under conditions other than honorable.
Thus, under the wording of the bill, a second discharge board might
be free to recommend a general discharge even though the first
board had recommended retention or an honorable discharge. The
March 21, 1962-soon after it had been extensively criticized during the 1962 Senate
hearings.
.,7 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964).
248 With respect to the boards of review created under Uniform Code of Military
Justice art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964), the argument might be made that the rating
practice has deprived the accused of an independent review by each member of the
board-the type of review contemplated by Congress in establishing these boards.
Cf. United States v. Deain, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 17 C.M.R. 44 (1954).
2 0 10 U.S.C. § 844 (1964).
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new Department of Defense Directive in this connection seems to
go further than the proposed legislation; 250 it allows referral of the
case to a new board only if the discharge authority "finds legal
prejudice to the substantial rights of the respondent." 25' Moreover,
the new board's proceedings cannot result in discharge action less
favorable to the respondent than that which was recommended by
the previous board.
252
Simplification of court-martial procedure is the goal of S. 757,
which does not deal directly with administrative discharges. How-
ever, this simplification will make court-martial action a more at-
tractive remedy for misconduct.
S. 758, to which the Armed Services seem strongly opposed, would
provide a right to trial by court-martial for a member of the Armed
Forces whom it is proposed to separate "under conditions other
than honorable on the grounds of alleged misconduct." 25 3 This right
to trial by court-martial clearly is not recognized in military law
at the present time; and military authorities contend that creating
this right would undercut their needed authority to separate
an unsuitable or unfit serviceman expeditiously.
There are several answers to these objections. Recent court
decisions indicate that an administrative discharge may not always
be so expeditious a method for separating a serviceman over his
determined opposition, if he is directed by a skillful attorney. And
the separation may prove illegal a few years later when the former
serviceman recovers a substantial judgment for back pay in the
Court of Claims. Most importantly, under the present law the
250 See 1965 Dep't of Defense Directive para. IX. (D.)7.
251 Ibid.
2" Ibid.
253 S. 758, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965). The bill does not apply to misconduct for
which the respondent has been convicted in a state or federal court of competent
jurisdiction. Apparently, however, the right to elect trial by court-martial would
exist with respect to misconduct for which a serviceman had been convicted in a
foreign court-although, by his request for trial by court-martial, the serviceman
would be deemed to have waived any defense or plea of double jeopardy that the
foreign trial might otherwise make available, pursuant to treaty guarantees like
those in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, art. VII, para. 8, [1953]
2 U.S.T. 8: O.IA. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846. See S. 758, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
This statutory right under S. 758 to demand trial with respect to the misconduct
for which he has been convicted in a foreign court would conflict in part with 1965
Dep't of Defense Directive para. VII. (J.)L. That directive authorizes an undesirable
discharge by reason of a foreign court conviction of an offense for which the maximum
penalty under the Uniform Code would be confinement in excess of one year.
A right to elect trial by court-martial appears in various forms in Uniform Code
of Military Justice arts. 4, 15, 20, 10 U.S.C. §§ 804, 815, 820 (1964).
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serviceman may be deprived of valuable procedural protections
because military authorities have decided to discharge him ad-
ministratively, rather than by means of court-martial action; and
this deprivation is a high price to pay for other supposed gains.
A choice would exist for military authorities under the pro-
visions of S. 758: if they wish to discharge a serviceman under other
than honorable conditions and he has requested a court-martial,
he cannot be proceeded against further administratively for his al-
leged misconduct. If, however, the primary concern is simply to
get rid of him as soon as possible, the military still have the means
of doing so; there is apparently nothing in the bill that would give
a serviceman the right to demand a court-martial if it were pro-
posed to discharge him, because of his misconduct, with a discharge
under honorable conditions-either honorable or general.
In some instances a respondent serviceman, anticipating that
the Government would have difficulty in proving its case before a
court-martial because of lack of a corpus delicti, unavailability of
key witnesses, or the like, might elect to request court-martial in ac-
cord with S. 758. And he might win on this gamble-with the re-
sult that a guilty person would escape almost unscathed. The
gamble, however, is not always attractive. The administrative dis-
charge, even when under other than honorable conditions, does not
allow the imposition of any sentence to confinement. On the other
hand, the accused who requests trial by court-martial for his alleged
misconduct may ultimately be convicted and serve an extensive term
of confinement.
The military also argue that S. 758 would deprive them of the
power to get rid of the person who is unfit because he participates
in many petty violations of law and order; this type of person now
is frequently discharged administratively. However, in light of the
"permissible additional punishments" authorized by the Manual
for Courts-Martial, courts-martial are also presently empowered to
deal with such a person by punishing him as an habitual offender;
25 4
thus, a commander would not be remediless.
Abolition of the summary court-martial is provided by S. 759.
While this bill concerns military justice, it has some relevance to
administrative discharges in that several convictions by summary
courts-martial provide excellent documentation of a pattern of mis-
'25 See note 26 supra.
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conduct-which, in turn, demonstrates unfitness. However, the
very ease with which convictions by summary court-martial can be
pyramided into more serious consequences furnish one argument
for the abolition of that type of military tribunal.
Subpoena power for administrative discharge boards, as well as
for the discharge review boards and the correction boards, would be
authorized by S. 760.255 In this way a solution would be provided
for the difficulty adverted to in Gamage v. Zuckert25 -namely, that
the respondent may have been granted the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses whose statements have been used
against him, but the board has no power to compel the witnesses'
attendance. The Department of Defense has indicated that it may
not oppose extension of the subpoena power to administrative
discharge boards, 257 subject to some limitation on unreasonable
requests for witnesses; but it does oppose extension of the subpoena
power to the discharge review boards or the correction boards.
CONCLUSION
After the Uniform Code of Military Justice took effect on May 31,
1951, a pronounced trend developed to substitute administrative
discharge action for trials by court-martial in instances where a
major objective was to eliminate a troublemaker from the service.
The administrative discharge was speedy, and apparently it was
not subject to judicial review. Moreover, an undesirable dis-
charge given administratively could subject the recipient to many
of the same consequences that would accompany a punitive dis-
charge.
The use of administrative action to bypass the safeguards of
the Uniform Code disturbed both Congress and the courts. Perhaps
largely as a result of congressional studies and judicial decisions,
the Armed Services have changed materially the procedures gov-
erning administrative discharges. Thus, the issuance of an ad-
ministrative discharge is becoming less and less the line of least
resistance for military authorities to follow; and, as a result, the
255 S. 760, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965). Subpoena power would also be authorized
for the pre-trial investigations required by Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32,
10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964)-that is, cases where a general court-martial may take place.
25O Civil No. 1124-64, D.D.C., Nov. 9, 1965.
257However, the Department apparently considers that this power should be
extended by some means other than amendment of article 46 of the Uniform Code,
10 U.S.C. § 846 (1964). Article 46, it has been suggested, should be limited to military
justice matters.
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pendulum is swinging back toward the utilization of courts-martial
to deal with misconduct.
Even though administrative discharge action is now much less
a threat to the rights of service personnel than it was only a few
years ago, there is still a need for legislation to deal more specifically
with some of the uncharted areas and to provide rules that cannot
be changed at the will of the military. Senator Ervin's proposals
and the recent Senate hearings thereon should point the way to the
enactment of this needed legislation.
